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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between endogenously incomplete 
contracts and the selection of procurement terms. We take advantage of variation in 
the workload of contracting officers to estimate the relationship between contractual 
incompleteness and procurement outcomes such as the use of competitive 
acquisitions procedures and the risk of renegotiation. In a sample of 150,000 
contracts from 85 civilian procurement offices over 11 years, we find that shocks that 
increase the cost of writing complete contracts, such as increases in contracting 
officer workload, lead to decreased reliance on competitive acquisition procedures, 
decreased reliance on firm-fixed-price contracts, increased risk of renegotiation, and 
higher total costs of procurement. In a sample of 4.6 million contracts from 32 DoD 
procurement offices over six years, we find that increases in the cost of writing 
complete contracts lead to decreased reliance on competitive acquisition 
procedures, increased reliance on firm-fixed-price contracts, increased risk of 
renegotiation, and increased total costs of procurement.  Although the effect of 
limited acquisitions capacity on contingency contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
generated a lot of concern recently, we find that, if anything, these contracts are a 
little less responsive to workload.  The DoD’s acquisitions manpower has not kept up 
with the exceptional growth in the level of acquisitions contracting over the past 
decade. This paper clarifies some of the potential economic consequences of the 
resulting increase in workload faced by DoD contracting officers. 
Keywords: Workload, Contracting, Procurement 
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A man who is very busy seldom changes his opinions. 
– Friedrich Nietzsche (ALL TOO HUMAN, 511; 1908 ) 
Composing a carefully constructed and detailed contract takes time, both in 
planning and execution. A contracting officer who has a limited time budget must 
divide his time among the contracting tasks at hand. If the number of tasks 
increases, less time will necessarily be devoted to each, often leaving some 
contingencies unaddressed. The choice to leave contracts less and less complete 
may also affect other procurement terms: pricing structure, extent to which the 
contract is competed, and even the final price paid. This paper examines the effects 
of an exogenous shift in the cost of contractual completeness, induced by shocks to 
workload, on both completeness itself and other related procurement features. 
This report is divided into two major sections: civilian and DoD. We begin with 
the civilian analysis, since the dataset is a little broader and suffers from fewer 
identification problems. We then turn to the DoD analysis which mirrors that 
conducted in the civilian context.  The results of the two are broadly consistent:  
busier contracting officers write contracts that are more likely to be renegotiated at a 
later date, use less competitive acquisitions procedures, and obligate more money. 
The only conflict between the civilian and military analysis is in the pricing terms—in 
the civilian context, busier contracting officers use more cost-plus contracts, while 



























After briefly outlining the procurement process in the U.S. federal 
government, we build a model that extends a simple version of Bajari and Tadelis 
(2001) to understand the choice of contractual completeness and contractual terms 
in the presence of varying workload. 
This model predicts that busier contracting officers choose to write less-
complete contracts, leading to more renegotiations as unspecified eventualities 
arrive. Anticipating these costly renegotiations, the officers decrease their use of 
fixed-price contracts, which are more difficult to renegotiate than cost-plus contracts. 
Since the specified features of the contract form the basis for competition, less 
complete contracts decrease the benefits of competition, so busier contracting 
officers use less competitive procurement mechanisms. Finally, busier contracting 
officers actually end up paying more for a given project, in expectation, because 
renegotiation is costly, cost-plus contracts give little incentive for cost-saving effort, 
and less competitive acquisition procedures lead to less efficient selection of 
contractors. 
With this model to structure the investigation, I analyze a sample of 150,000 
contracts from a panel of 85 civilian federal procurement offices over 11 years. 
Exogenous shocks that increase the cost of writing complete contracts, such as 
increases in contracting officer workload, decrease the use of competitive acquisition 
procedures, decrease the use of firm-fixed-price contracts, increase the risk of 
renegotiation, and lead to higher total costs of procurement. Each of these results is 
consistent with the predictions of the model. 
These results shed new light on a number of important questions about the 
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the section Determinants of Procurement Terms, either take the degree of 
completeness as exogenous or look for differences in completeness induced by the 
underlying complexity of the project. Since the variation in completeness here is 
induced by a completely different source (workload), the set of potential confounders 
is quite different, so the broad consistency of the results presented here with that 
earlier literature should be reassuring. Furthermore, I provide a comprehensive 
framework for understanding the codetermination of contractual completeness and 
many contractual/procurement terms.  This framework can unify the constellation of 
disparate results in the literature that look at the effects of completeness on one 
particular contractual feature at a time.1 
In addition to contributing to the academic literature on the causes and effects 
of incomplete contracting, in this paper I also address a pressing policy question. 
The U.S. federal government, over the past decade, has been faced with exactly this 
situation. From FY2000 to FY2010, the total spending on U.S. federal procurement 
contracts grew from just over $200 billion to over $500 billion (FPDS-NG).  After 
accounting for inflation, this growth represents more than a doubling of real 
contractual expenditures. In this same period, the relative importance of 
procurement in the total federal budget has also grown. In FY2000, contracting 
made up 12% of total federal expenditures, while by FY2010 it had risen to 22% 
(Census, 2011). 
Despite the dramatic growth in procurement contracting, there has been no 
concomitant growth in the number of contracting personnel. In FY2000, there were 
26,588 contracting officers (occupational designation GS-1102) government-wide.  
By FY2010, the workforce had increased to 35,707, an increase of only 34%. Over 
the same period, the number of procurement assistants (GS-1106) actually fell, from 
3,635 to 1,664 (OPM, FedScope).  Figure 1 presents these trends graphically. In 
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panel A, obligations and contracting officers in 1998 are normalized to 100, while 
panel B illustrates the growth in real procurement spending per contracting officer. 
Figure 1. Workload Trends over Time 
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Panel B. Real Obligations per Officer 
 
Note. Contracting officer employment is total federal GS-1102 employment indicated for the fiscal 
year. Total contractual obligations are from FPDS-NG and summarized by www.usaspending.org. 
Real obligations were deflated to 2009 dollars by the CPI. 
Concern about the strain of increased contracting in an environment of 
relatively fixed contracting capacity has been present within the acquisitions 
community for some time.2 
Potential negative consequences include fraud vulnerability, insufficient 
oversight, problems with cost or quality certification, dependence on excessively 
simplistic or boilerplate contracts, weak bargaining in negotiated contracts, and 
excessive dependence on private contractors to perform contracting functions. This 
concern has some anecdotal support at the level of individual investigations and 
                                            
2 See the Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and 
the United States Congress (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007), Chapter 5, for an overview, as well as 
a large body of work by the GAO: High-Risk Series: An Update (2005a); DoD Acquisitions: 
Contracting for Better Outcomes (2006c); Contract Management: DoD Vulnerabilities to Contracting 
Fraud, Waste and Abuse (2006b); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon 
Programs (2006a); Defense Acquisitions: DoD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees 
Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes (2005c); Defense Management: DoD Needs to Demonstrate that 
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surveys of acquisitions professionals.3  The concern led to a push to increase 
contracting capacity, especially within the DoD. But the magnitude and direction of 
any effect of binding contracting capacity on contractual outcomes has not been 
subject to rigorous theoretical and statistical investigation. This is the first such 
evaluation. 
In the rest of this section, I put the paper in context, both in terms of the 
existing literature and the policy environment. In the Modeling the Procurement 
Process section, I build a model of the effects of workload on contractual 
completeness and contract/procurement terms and derive some testable 
implications. In the Civilian Data and Methodology section, I discuss the data and 
the empirical approach. In the Civilian Results section , I present the empirical 
results, and in the Summary of Civilian Analysis section, I briefly conclude. 
Determinants of Procurement Terms 
The economics literature on the determinants of contractual form is quite 
robust and mature. For a summary, see Lafontaine and Slade (in press). In the 
particular case of procurement contracts, several papers have investigated the 
determinants of the specific features examined here. I review those results in the 
following paragraphs. The overarching approach taken in this paper, where 
contractual completeness is endogenously determined and, in turn, affects the other 
contractual provisions, was pioneered by Goldberg (1977) and formalized by Bajari 
and Tadelis (2001). 
This framework has been used to investigate the decision to open a contract 
to competition, often couched in terms of “auctions versus negotiations.”  In the 
context of private construction contracts, Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2008) find 
that more complex projects are procured less competitively and, holding complexity 
                                            
3 See, for example, Rau and Stambersky (2009), who find that less than 15% of senior contracting 
officers surveyed at the Army Contracting Command felt that there were an adequate number of 
acquisition management positions in their installation. Furthermore, only 23% felt that service 
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fixed, competitive procurements are more likely to be renegotiated. Gil and Oudot 
(2008) find similar results in the context of French defense procurements, at least 
within a given buyer-seller relationship, as do Leffler, Rucker, and Munn (2007), in 
the context of private timber sales. All these papers look at how the use of 
competitive procurement methods is affected by differences in completeness driven 
by the underlying difficulty of the project. My approach is different because I look for 
differences in completeness induced by exogenous variation in the opportunity cost 
of the contracting officer’s time due to changes in workload. Nevertheless, the 
results are quite consistent with the existing literature. 
Parallel to the literature on “auctions versus negotiations” is the literature on 
pricing terms, often characterized as “fixed-price versus cost-plus.” In the context of 
timber auctions, Leffler and Rucker (1991) find that simpler-to-specify tracts are 
more likely to be sold at fixed prices. Kalnins and Mayer (2004) find that when 
quality is difficult to measure, and, therefore, difficult to contract on, the IT services 
industry uses more cost-plus contracts. Corts and Singh (2004) find that oil 
exploration companies increase their use of cost-plus contracts for drilling 
contractors as their experience with those contractors grows and posit that this 
change occurs because opportunities for repeat business strengthen the incentives 
for efficiency more than they reduce the costs of specifying complete contracts. 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993) find the opposite pattern, in the context of Air Force 
engine procurement, and argue that as the buyer gains more information over time it 
becomes easier to write complete contingent contracts. The approach in Crocker 
and Reynolds (1993) is closest to this paper, in that they identify how changes in the 
contracting agencies’ ease of writing complete contracts affects the pricing methods 
chosen. They focus on a single agency and a very specific type of contract, but the 
results from my broader panel IV approach are quite similar. 
Finally, a very few studies have directly targeted the question of the costs and 
incidence of renegotiation and contractual incompleteness, independent of the 
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(2008) find that concession contracts in Latin America are more likely to be 
renegotiated if the firm is not regulated or if the quality of the bureaucracy that 
oversees the concession is low.  Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2010) use a 
structural approach to analyze a set of California Highway Procurement auctions 
and find that the ex-post adaptation costs make up between 7 and 13% of the 
winning bid. Consistent with these results, I find that decreasing workload leads to 
less frequent renegotiation and lower prices. 
By contrast to the extensive research on contractual incompleteness and 
procurement terms, the formal literature on the effects of workload specifically is 
sparse. A large literature exists on the measurement of workload, which I reference 
when discussing my own approach. There has been some work on the role of 
contracting capacity in the context of local and municipal governments in the public 
administration literature, but this literature has concerned itself primarily with the 
determinants of contracting capacity rather than its effects and has been mostly 
qualitative in nature. See, for example, Brown and Potoski (2003), and Yang, Hsieh, 
and Li (2009). 
In summary, this paper sits squarely in the broad literature that examines the 
causes and effects of incomplete contracts. It uses a novel source of identification, 
workload, which may be of independent interest, and it relies on a uniquely 
extensive set of contracts. The results fit nicely with the existing literature, 
simultaneously confirming many of the general findings about the effects of 
incomplete contracting on contractual and procurement terms, under different 
identification conditions, while bringing them into a common framework. 
The Civilian Procurement Process 
The U.S. federal government’s procurement process progresses in three 
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continues with the solicitation and award stage, and ends with the contract 
management and closeout stage.4 
In the first stage, the agency determines it has some need to perform its 
mission that it cannot fulfill with its current resources. If an analysis of this need 
determines that a procurement is the appropriate response, the procurement 
process begins. A contracting officer (or his delegate) designs a procurement 
strategy in light of authorizing legislation, the agency’s needs, market conditions, 
and the dictates of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2012) and agency-
specific acquisition regulations. At this point, the agency decides the degree and 
method by which the contract will be competed, the form of pricing appropriate to the 
contract, and whether the contract will be for a definitive quantity or some indefinite  
delivery vehicle. 
Once it is determined which contractual forms and procurement mechanisms 
are appropriate, the agency moves to the second stage of the process.  If the 
contract is expected to be above $25,000, the agency solicits offers through various 
channels, including the Federal Business Opportunities website. The solicitation 
outlines, at a minimum, a description of the agency’s needs, the format that offers 
should take, who is allowed to make an offer, and the method by which those offers 
will be evaluated. Offerors respond to this description as appropriate. Responses 
may be a simple price bid, a more complicated proposal, or even entering into a 
bilateral or multilateral negotiation including exchanges of proposals and responses 
with the agency. These offers are evaluated in accord with the provisions outlined in 
the original solicitation and an award is made. 
Once the contract is awarded, the agency moves into the third stage of the 
process, contract management. The contractor begins work on the project, and the 
agency oversees this effort as appropriate. This oversight may include inspection for 
                                            
4 Adapted from the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) Training Blueprint 
(Federal Acquisition Institute, Office of Governmentwide Policy, & General Services Administration, 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 11 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
quality, adherence to specifications, and auditing of costs. It is at this stage, as well, 
that unanticipated problems may arise, leading to modifications of the original 
contract. Depending on the degree and reason for the modifications, the result may 
be simple unilateral modifications or bilateral agreements that require some 
equitable adjustment to pricing. Finally, the contract will come to an end, and the 
relationship between the contractor or agency will be complete. This can occur either 
because the terms were satisfied or because the contract was terminated by the 
agency for any number of reasons, including convenience and misconduct. 
Throughout this entire process, the government’s primary representatives are 
civil service employees in the occupational series GS-1102, broadly referred to as 
contracting officers. The Position Classification Standard for the Contracting Series 
(Office of Personnel Management [OPM], 1983) describes their role as follows: 
This series includes positions that manage, supervise, perform, or develop 
policies and procedures for professional work involving the procurement of 
supplies, services, construction, or research and development using formal 
advertising or negotiation procedures; the evaluation of contract price 
proposals; and the administration or termination and close out of contracts. 
The work requires knowledge of the legislation, regulations, and methods 
used in contracting; and knowledge of business and industry practices, 
sources of supply, cost factors, and requirements characteristics. (p.3) 
These agents are assisted in their task by a number of support personnel, 
including purchasing officers (GS-1105s, who concentrate on simplified 
acquisitions), procurement clerical and assistance series employees (GS-1106s, 
who provide clerical support), and contracting officer representatives and contracting 
officer technical representatives (various series, who develop the contracts’ technical 
requirements and determine if a contractor meets them). I will use ceteris paribus 
variation in the number of the (GS-1102) contracting officers to measure changes in 
workload. 
In the next section, I construct a formal model that includes the key features 
of this formal procurement process in order to trace the effects of a shock to 
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Modeling the Procurement Process 
To structure the investigation of the effects of contracting officer workload, I 
present here a model of the procurement process with endogenous contractual 
design. This model builds on the analysis in Bajari and Tadelis (2001) of the choice 
between fixed-price and cost-plus contracts. Consistent with that model, I focus on 
the trade-off between cost-saving effort with fixed-price contracts and ease of 
renegotiation with cost-plus contracts, and on how this trade-off is affected by the 
endogenous choice of contractual completeness. But rather than derive the trade-off 
from first principles, I include a simplified version of this finding as an assumption in 
the model and leave the interested reader to follow up on the micro- foundations in 
the original.  Instead, I broaden the analysis to also investigate the choice between 
competitive procurements and limited-source negotiations.  In this second 
dimension, the trade-off is slightly different between the cost of implementing and 
documenting a competitive procurement and the benefit of selecting the ex-ante 
lowest cost producer. Again, the endogenous choice of contractual completeness 
will interact with this trade-off, since finding the lowest cost producer of the specified 
product is only useful if the product is correctly specified. 
Primitives 
Players and Payoffs 
The central actor in the model is the contracting officer. The total payoff of the 
contracting officer depends on three elements: the value they receive from the 
product or service, net of payments to the contractor; the cost of specifying 
contractual contingencies; and the cost of running a procurement competition.5 
Assume that the product or service is valued by the contracting officer at some dollar 
value, 0. If the final outlay for the contract is p, his net value is given by . 
                                            
5 In reality, the contracting officer is an agent in a bureaucracy, so will not be residual claimant. For 
simplicity, I ignore this complication and simply assume he is facing some set of incentives that leads 
him to value saving time and money on the project and on its procurement. Having him only receive a 
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The cost of writing a contract that explicitly specifies the contractor’s obligations 
under all possible contingencies would be prohibitive. Instead, the contracting officer 
will choose a level of contractual completeness 	 ∈ 0, 1 , where the contract covers 
all circumstances that actually arise with probability t, and with probability 1  
some unanticipated event occurs which will require some off-contract performance in 
order for the agency to receive that value v. The cost of preparing such a contract, in 
terms of the contracting officer’s time and effort, is given by , where 0
0, ′ 0 	 	0,	d" 0, and → ∞. Here, w measures the workload borne 
by the contracting officer on other projects, so the opportunity cost of his time is 
higher when the workload is higher.6 Finally, I assume that there is some additional 
cost of running a competitive procurement, m, where the cost comes in soliciting and 
analyzing competitive bids completely and documenting the process carefully.7 To 
summarize, the utility of a contracting officer with workload w, expecting to pay price 
p is given by 
, ∗  
The other participants in the model are the contracting firms. I assume there 
are 	 2 potential bidders, indexed by i, and they have initial costs of production ci 
drawn from a common distribution 	 , which is bounded below by zero and above 
by ̅ with expected value . If an unanticipated eventuality arises, the cost of 
providing the contracted good or service may change. I assume this alternative cost, 
k, is independently drawn from a distribution, 	 , bounded below by zero and 
above by ̅, with expected value . I assume that it remains efficient to 
complete the contract, so , but on average modifications will be more costly 
than non-modifications, since some costs will be nonrecoverable.  Finally, whichever 
                                            
6 I model the effects of workload as a change in an exogenous parameter for simplicity, but it would 
be easy to provide microfoundations with a model of time allocation among more and more contracts, 
a fixed time budget, and decreasing marginal value of effort on an outside project. 
7 The real possibility of a bid protest makes the documentation effort especially salient. See, for 
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cost is realized, the contractor can reduce that cost by putting forth unobservable 
effort, e, at effort cost, , so if the applicable cost draw is c, the final real cost is 
, while the accounting cost is . I assume that the costs are such that 
even efficient effort will never make the expected costs negative. Formally, I define 
 by ′ 1, and let ≡  represent the net cost savings of this 
efficient effort. Fixed-price contracts will induce this efficient effort, but even then 
expected costs are positive (I assume that ). 
Timing, Negotiation, and Renegotiation 
The timing of the model is as follows: 
1. The contracting officer decides whether to issue a fixed-price or cost-
plus contract, whether to run a competition, and how completely to 
specify the contract. 
2. Bidders make offers as allowed by the procurement provisions, and a 
winner is selected. 
3. Unanticipated contingencies may arise, which lead to renegotiation. 
4. The winning bidder makes cost-saving efforts. 
5. Final production occurs, and contracts are paid. 
Given a contractual form and specification, I assume that competition always 
takes the form of a second-price or second-cost auction.8 For a fixed-price contract, 
this means the lowest bidder wins and is paid the second-lowest bid. For a cost-plus 
contract, this means that the firm with the lowest cost wins and is awarded a cost-
plus contract in which they are fully compensated for all realized costs, plus they are 
paid a fixed difference between their cost and the second-lowest cost. Absent any 
changes, this contract would pay them exactly the second-lowest cost. Of course, if 
actual costs are higher than expected they are paid more, and if actual costs are 
                                            
8 This assumption is simply to make the calculation very transparent. First-price auctions would yield 
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lower than expected, they are paid less. So, for example, if the lowest initial cost was 
five and the second lowest was seven, the lowest bidder would be awarded a 
contract paying 2 , where C is whatever the final costs of production are. 
For negotiations, the buyer is vested with a very extreme form of bargaining 
power throughout. This assumption simplifies the analysis and allows us to 
concentrate on comparative statics with respect to workload. I assume that when 
negotiation or renegotiation occurs, the buyer will always make a take-it or leave-it 
offer. I assume that the buyer knows all relevant cost information when making this 
offer. These assumptions make negotiation/renegotiation more attractive than they 
are, in practice, but will not affect the change in their relative attractiveness as the 
workload changes. 
Consistent with the results of Bajari and Tadelis (2001), I assume there are 
some frictions in the renegotiation of fixed-price contracts, so an offer of  to the 
seller actually costs the buyer 1 , with 	 0 measuring the friction.9 Cost-plus 
contracts, by contrast, are assumed to be completely flexible. If the cost of 
production goes up or down with a modification, so will the payment, one-for-one. 
The Costs and Benefits of Contractual Completeness 
Our interest here is understanding the effects of increasing workload on 
contractual completeness, contract pricing, the decision to compete the contract, 
and the price paid. Workload only appears in one place in the model, in the marginal 
cost of contractual completeness. Since contractual completeness is set optimally, 
an increase in its marginal cost will obviously tend to decrease the equilibrium level 
of completeness. The effects of workload on all the other contractual choices arise 
due to the adjustment in optimal completeness. 
                                            
9 Perhaps information is not fully available, so there is some monopsonistic inefficiency in the take-it 
or leave-it offer, whereby inefficiently little trade occurs. Perhaps the process of rewriting a fixed-price 
contract, itself, involves some extra contracting costs. Different micro-foundations are possible. I 
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Compare, first, the payoffs to fixed-price versus cost-plus contracts. The 
advantage of fixed-price contracts is the efficient provision of cost-reducing effort by 
the contractor, since the contractor is residual claimant on any cost savings. The 
advantage of cost-plus contracts is the ease of renegotiation, by assumption.  If 
there were no chance of unforeseen contingencies, fixed-price contracts would 
unambiguously dominate, but, as contracts become less and less complete, cost-
plus contracts may become optimal. Since increasing workload leads the contracting 
officer to decrease completeness, cost-plus contracts become attractive as workload 
increases. 
Compare, next, competition versus negotiation. The advantage of negotiation 
is that the contracting official can forgo the time and cost of conducting a full-and-
open competitive procurement.  The advantage of competition is that an ex-ante 
more efficient producer is selected. But this efficiency advantage only occurs in the 
absence of modification. If modification is certain, negotiation unambiguously 
dominates since a cost advantage with respect to the initial project c tells us nothing 
about the final costs, k. As workload lightens, officers choose more complete 
contracts, and competition may become optimal if the cost advantage is important 
enough, relative to the costs of running the competition.  
Furthermore, both the initial winning bid and final expected payment made by 
the contracting officer should be increasing in workload.  The change in initial bid 
occurs due to the decreasing use of competition and fixed-price contracts. The effect 
on final expected payment is even more direct. The reason you write more complete 
contracts is to decrease the expected amount paid.  If less completeness actually 
led to lower expected payments, the contracting officer should move to those less 
complete contracts even absent a push from workload. Since completeness declines 
in workload, expected cost must increase. 
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Proposition 1 
Let ∗ , ,  represent the equilibrium level of contractual completeness. 
Let ∗ , ,  represent the equilibrium decision to use a fixed-price contract 
(where 1 means using a fixed-price contract,  and 0 means using a cost-
plus contract). Let ∗ , ,  represent the equilibrium decision to run a 
procurement competition (where 1 means using a competitive procurement,  
and 0 means single-source negotiating). As workload (w	) increases, all three 
equilibrium choices weakly decrease and expected winning bid and final expected 
costs increase. 
Proof. Appendix 
In the empirical analysis in the next section, I investigate all five 
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Civilian Data and Methodology 
I construct measures of workload and contractual/procurement terms from a 
large public database of government contracts. The contract data consist of every 
transaction above a reporting threshold from FY2000 to FY2010 for 85 civilian 
agencies, over four million actions in all.10  Gathered from the Federal Procurement 
Data System (Next Generation), through www.usaspending.gov, the contract data 
include procurement contract transactions reported directly through the contract 
writing systems of the constituent agencies. Each initial government obligation 
above a reporting threshold ($25,000 before 2005 and $3,000 after) appears exactly 
one time, as does every modification of a reported contract. Each element includes a 
broad range of information about the contracting parties, the contractual terms, and 
the method of procurement. The particular provisions that form the basis for the 
analysis are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. 
I measure the number of contracting officers in an agency by counting the 
number of GS-1102s. The data on the GS-1102 employment in each contracting 
agency in each fiscal year comes from the Office of Personnel Management’s 
Central Personnel Data File. It reports the number of contracting officers in each 
agency at the end of each fiscal year, by years of experience in that agency, as well 
as the number of such officers leaving the federal service by reason of departure. 
                                            
10 This consists of every civilian agency/sub-agency that reports non-zero GS-1102s to the Office of 
Personnel Management and more than 500 contractual actions to the Federal Procurement Data 
System (Next Generation), with a few exceptions.  The following agencies are dropped for irregular 
reporting with many missing observations. From the DHHS: Program Support Center. From the DoT: 
Federal Aviation Administration and the Surface Transportation Board. From the GSA: Office of Chief 
Person Officer, Office of the Inspector General, and Office of Governmentwide Policy.  From USDA: 
Departmental Administration and Agricultural Marketing Service. From Treasury: Secret Service, 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau.  From 
Labor: Employment Standards Administration and OSHA. From DoJ: Immigration and Naturalization. 
Finally, a few agencies enter the sample after the beginning: From USDA, Rural Housing Service in 
2003, Natural Resource Conservation Service in 2003, and Office of Chief Financial Services in 2003; 
from DoJ, ATF in 2003; from Homeland Security, Headquarters in 2005; and from DoT, Pipeline and 
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We choose to focus on civilian agencies, despite the fact that defense 
agencies make up the majority of procurement spending, for three reasons. First, 
there are many more civilian agencies, allowing for greater variation in workload. 
Second, all contracting officers in civilian agencies are GS-1102s, while in military 
contracting offices the procurement work may be shared with career military officers. 
Finally, there may be differential reporting in defense agencies, where a greater 
fraction of contracts are classified for reasons of national security. Although I have 
no reason to believe that the results here would not extend to defense agencies, 
care should be taken in applying them. 
Finally, there are a few cases of agencies moving among departments, 
passing out of existence, or merging. The most important of these was the formation 
of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, and the 2005 merger of the 
Federal Supply Service with the Federal Technology Service. In all cases, the 
original and transformed agencies are coded separately, since they may change in 
unobservable ways as a result of their reorganization. 
Contractual Types and Terms 
Even within a single agency, contracts vary enormously. I analyze the effects 
of workload on four endogenous aspects of contracts: competition, pricing terms, 
modification, and outlays. Of course, the effects of workload may go beyond these 
simple factors, but I limit my attention to these factors for a first look into the 
problem. In addition to these endogenous factors, contracts also vary in their 
exogenous underlying characteristics. It is important for inference to control for these 
factors as well. I will discuss two important exogenous factors first and then turn to 
the endogenous outcomes.11 
                                            
11 A parallel analysis to that conducted in this section for the two simplified contracts types is available 
from the author. The results are broadly in line with these, with the exception of dollars obligated on 
delivery orders, which seem to increase with the number of contracting officers. But given the 
evidence of substitutions, those estimates need to be interpreted with care, since they may suffer 
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The first exogenous dimension along which contracts vary is the product or 
service class of the procurement. The General Services Administration divides every 
product or service purchased by the U.S. federal government into one of 24 services 
classes or one of 90 product classes.12 Each contract indicates the primary 
product/service class of the acquisition. Within civilian agencies some of these 
classes, such as Nuclear Ordinance, are not represented or very small, so I collapse 
them into neighboring categories. After these combinations, there are 55 broad 
product/service categories.13 
The second exogenous dimension along which contracts vary is the mix of 
award types. Awards are first divided by whether they specify a fixed quantity 
(definitive contract) or leave some quantities unspecified (indefinite delivery 
vehicle). Very small awards (currently below $3,000) are known as 
“micropurchases,” and are exempted from a number of competition and reporting 
requirements. Finally, purchases above the $3,000 threshold but below the 
$150,000 simplified acquisitions threshold should be conducted in accordance with 
simplified acquisitions procedures and are explicitly set aside for small 
businesses. These awards are known as “purchase orders” and tend to be for very 
standardized commercially available products or services.14 
Compared to other features of the contract, the contracting agency has little 
discretion over the product class and award type, as they are primarily dictated by 
the nature of the good or service to be acquired. For this paper, I limit my 
investigation to the effects of workload on the contractual terms of original definitive 
contracts above the original $25,000 reporting threshold. Below, in Table 2, I provide 
                                            
12 For definitions, see Federal Procurement Data System Product and Service Codes Manual (GSA, 
2011). 
13 Details of matches are available by request. 
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evidence that there is little substitution between definitive contracts and other 
contract award types as a response to changes in workload. 
Definitive contracts are a more attractive sample than purchase orders 
because the contracting and competition process is much more intensive and 
specialized, and the contracting officer must exercise considerably more judgment 
and expertise.  Definitive contracts are also a more attractive group than calls on 
indefinite delivery vehicles, because it is clear exactly when the bulk of the 
contracting work took place. For an indefinite delivery vehicle, the context of the 
initial umbrella contract is important, but so is the context for each individual 
specification of a call on that contract, and these two contexts may interact in quite 
complicated ways. For the same reason, I do not investigate the terms of 
modifications, per se, other than identifying whether a modification took place, the 
reason for the modification, and how the modification affected the obligations on the 
original contract.  One could examine, in addition, the pricing terms and competitive 
terms of the modification, per se, but I do not do so here. Finally, I only look at 
contracts above the original $25,000 reporting threshold.  Some contracts below this 
threshold are reported, but since the reporting is not obligatory, reporting rates may 
adjust with workload. My focus on original definitive contracts above the reporting 
threshold winnows the sample enormously, from over four million total contractual 
actions to only about 150,000 qualifying contracts. 
The first endogenous dimension along which contracts vary is the pricing 
structure. For modeling purposes, I divide simply between fixed-price and cost-plus 
contracts. In reality, they are much more finely delineated, including firm fixed price; 
fixed price with various price adjustments, effort requirements, and incentive 
payments; cost plus fixed fee; cost plus various incentive fees; time and materials; 
and various hybrid forms. In the sample of original definitive contracts, firm-fixed-
price contracts make up 85% of all contracts. According to the Federal Acquisitions 
Regulation (FAR, 2012), fixed-price contracts should be used when the contract risk 
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government can reasonably agree on a maximum price. Official government policy is 
to prefer firm-fixed-price contracts when possible.15 
The second endogenous dimension along which contracts vary is the degree 
to which they are competed. The most open form of competition is termed “Full-and-
Open Competition,” which refers to any competitive method in which all responsible 
sources are permitted to compete.  It includes sealed bids, competitive proposals, 
and combinations of competitive procedures. A more limited level of competition is 
“Full-and-Open Competition after Exclusion of Sources,” in which some number of 
otherwise qualified bidders are excluded from the competition.  Such exclusions are 
primarily set-asides for preferred bidders, such as small businesses, Historically 
Under-utilized Business Zone (HUBZone) businesses, or service-disabled veteran-
owned businesses, but they can also be used if the use would reduce overall costs 
without harming competition, benefit national defense, ensure a reliable source, or 
satisfy a critical need. Finally, a contract may not be competed at all, either because 
its awarding procedure was explicitly specified by statute (Not Available for 
Competition) or because only one source was solicited for reasons authorized by 
regulation and justified by the contracting officer (Not Competed).  The most 
common justifications are the following: there is only one responsible source and no 
other suppliers will satisfy agency requirements, unusual and compelling urgency, 
and industrial mobilization. 
The third endogenous characteristic of original contracts I consider is that  
some are modified over time and some are not. The reasons for modification vary 
substantially. About half are strictly administrative, a funding-only action or a close 
out of a completed contract. But about 45% of modifications are some type of real 
change in the way the contract  will be carried out: unilateral requests for additional 
work, change orders, the exercise of options, and bilateral supplemental 
                                            
15 This policy was recently highlighted by a July 29, 2009, memorandum from the OMB to every chief 
acquisition officer in the federal bureaucracy requiring the use of firm-fixed-price contracts and 
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agreements. The remaining 5% are a collection of cancelations, terminations, and 
movements between definitive and indefinite contracts. 
Finally, contracts differ endogenously with respect to size of the government’s 
financial obligation. Every original contract has an initial level of expected obligation, 
and that obligation can be altered by subsequent modification. I look at both initial 
and final obligation, individually, since the model predicts effects on each. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for each of the characteristics for the 
full sample of contractual actions, for the subsample of original definitive contracts 
that will form the basis for the regressions below, and for the subset of those which 
are service contracts. Since services may be particularly difficult to fully specify, they 
may by particularly responsive to workload. I also consider a “Big Agencies” 
subsample consisting of the 39 agencies that had more than 500 original definitive 
contracts over the sample period; they are listed individually in Table 9. Since the 
“big agency” sample includes 140,000 of the 150,000 qualifying contracts, the 
summary statistics for it are nearly identical to the overall sample, so they are not 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics by Subsample 
 
Notes. The full sample includes all contractual action for 85 civilian contracting offices over 11 years 
(2000–2010). The second sample is limited to original definitive contracts. The third subsample is 
further limited to only the original definitive service contracts. 
The first set of sample statistics locates original definitive contracts in the 
constellation of all contractual actions.  Definitive contracts make up only 14% of all 
contractual actions and original contracts make up 39% of contractual actions, 
overall.  About 25% of those definitive contract actions are original contracts, with 
the rest being various sorts of modification. Of the original definitive contracts, over 
80% are service contracts. 
Full                Orig. Def.       O.D. Services 
Variable Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Definitive 0.14 0.35 1 0 1 0 
Original 0.39 0.49 1 0 1 0 
Orig. Def. 0.035 0.18 1 0 1 0 
 
Measures Of Competition 
Full and Open Comp. 0.61 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.40 0.49 
Excl. of Sources 0.089 0.28 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.36 
Not Comp. 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 
 
Contractual Pricing Form 
Firm Fixed                        0.65 0.48 0.85 0.36 0.83 0.38 
 
Substantive Changes (Pre-2009) 
Any Mods n.a.  0.37 0.48 0.43 0.49 
Termination n.a.  0.0079 0.089 0.0080 0.089 
# Mods n.a. 1.33 5.28 1.54 5.71 
 
Obligations  ($M2009) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.29 7.09 0.85 17.4 0.86 19.0 
Final Oblig ($M2009) n.a. 2.41 66.1 2.58 71.6 
 
Agency Characteristics (Weighted  by Sample Sizes) 
Any Retire 0.90 0.30 0.94 0.24 0.93 0.25 
Pct. Retire 0.031 0.030 0.035 0.025 0.034 0.024 
Pct. 10–20 0.25 0.10 0.26 0.097 0.27 0.093 
Pct. 20+ 0.47 0.11 0.51 0.11 0.50 0.10 
C. Officers 387.2 358.9 443.5 420.7 463.2 420.3 
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The second set of sample statistics describes competition. Overall, 61% of 
contractual actions are fully and openly competed, while only about 43% of original 
definitive contracts are. Instead, more original definitive contracts are either 
competed with exclusions of sources (15%, as compared to 9% overall) and not 
available for competition (27% in the excluded category, versus 18% overall). Again, 
services are even less likely to be competed than other definitive contracts. If we 
think one-off definitive contracts are harder to specify than average, and service 
contracts especially so, this pattern is consistent with the model. 
The third set of sample statistics is pricing form.  Overall, 65% of contractual 
actions have firmly fixed prices, while 85% of original definitive contracts do. 
The fourth set of sample statistics presents data on eventual modification.  It 
is defined only for original contracts, since every modification must accrue to one 
such contract. Among our sample of definitive contracts, substantive modification is 
very common, with 37% experiencing a substantive modification, and the average 
contract experiencing 1.33 such modifications.  Termination, by contrast, is quite 
rare, occurring in less than 1% of contracts. Again, services seem more subject to 
ex-post change, with 43% being modified with an average of 1.54 modifications per 
original contract. 
The final set of contract characteristics are obligations. The definitive 
contracts are big, with average initial obligation of $850,000 and an average final 
obligation of $2,410,000. They are nearly three times as large as the average 
contractual action. Services contracts initially obligated about the same as the 
average definitive contract, but the difference between initial and final obligations is 
bigger for them, on average. 
Finally, we have a set of office-level characteristics, where offices are 
weighted by the number of contracts. The average contractual action takes place in 
an office with 387 contracting officers, while the average original definitive contract is 
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definitive contracts are written in office/years that  experience at least one 
retirement, while only 90% of overall contractual actions are. Overall, contracting 
officers are quite experienced, with the average contract being written in an office in 
which 25% of officers have 10–20 years of experience and 50% of contracting 
officers having even more than that. 
Table 2 provides another way to look at the data, focusing on the original 
definitive contract that will make up the analysis subsample. It divides these 
contracts between fixed-price and variable-price contracts and further sub-divides 
them into contracts that are eventually modified and those that are never modified in 
our sample period (it is possible that some of the later contracts will be modified in 
the future).  The first thing to note, all the way at the bottom of the table, is the 
difference in the degree to which the two pricing types are modified. Consistent with 
the model, variable-price contracts are modified at a much higher rate than fixed-
price contracts.  Furthermore, even conditional on modification, they are modified 
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Table 2. Detailed Summary Statistics for Definitive Contracts by Pricing Terms 
and Eventual Modification 
 
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations are in parentheses for original definitive contracts.  
The sample is divided into by firm-fixed-price contracts and variable-price and further divided between 
those contracts that are eventually modified and those that are not.  Contract-office-level statistics are 
weighted by the number of original definitive contracts of the appropriate type. 
In terms of competition, there are a couple of notable differences across the 
classes. First the variable-price contracts that are never modified are much less 
likely to be fully competed, or to be competed with excluded sources, than average.  
Finally, they are overwhelmingly more likely than the other contract classes to be not 
available to competition.  Compared to the fixed-price contracts, the modified 
variable-price contracts are about half as likely to be competed with excluded 
sources and significantly more likely to not be competed at all. Among fixed-price 
contracts, those that are never modified are slightly more likely to be competed fully, 
Variable Price              Fixed Price 
 Never Mod. Mod. Never Mod. Mod 
Full and Open Comp. 0.29 0.45 0.46 0.42 
 (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
Excl. of Sources 0.044 0.087 0.15 0.20 
 (0.21) (0.28) (0.36) (0.40) 
Not Comp. 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.11 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) (0.31) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.54 2.31 0.49 1.24 
 (6.03) (59.7) (4.41) (8.42) 
Final Oblig ($M2009) 0.69 18.2 0.51 2.36 
 (6.40) (235.6) (4.50) (24.4) 
Modifications 0 4.74 0 3.26 
 (0) (8.24) (0) (8.13) 
Pct.  10–20 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 
 (0.097) (0.095) (0.099) (0.091) 
Pct.  20+ 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.50 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
C. Officers 247.9 229.6 514.1 418.9 
 (311.1) (237.9) (448.5) (392.4) 
Pct.  Retire 0.032 0.032 0.036 0.035 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) 
Any Retire 0.87 0.87 0.95 0.94 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.21) (0.24) 
n 11k 11k 82k 44k 
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slightly less likely to be competed with exclusions, and slightly more likely to not be 
competed at all. They are also slightly less likely to be not available to competition 
(the excluded category). 
For all contract pricing types, the initial and final obligations on never-modified 
contracts are smaller than those on eventually modified contracts.  Obviously, the 
difference between initial and final obligation is much bigger for modified contracts 
than for contracts that experienced no substantive modifications, but the obligations 
only double on average for modified fixed-price contracts, while they increase by 
about eight times for modified variable-price contracts. 
Finally, there does not seem to be much difference between the offices 
writing the contracts of the various types in terms of experience or retirement rates, 
but they do seem to differ in overall size. The average fixed-price contract is written 
in an office with about 450 GS-1102s, and those fixed-price contracts that are never 
modified are written in the largest offices of all (514 GS-1102s), while the average 
variable-price contract is written in the an office with about 240 GS-1102s. Variable-
price contracts that are eventually modified are written in the smallest offices of all 
(230 GS-1102s). Again, this pattern is consistent with the model, if we interpret few 
contracting officers as a measure of workload. Obviously, the offices with more 
contracting officers are more likely to experience a retirement (about 95% in the 
fixed-price contracts), but the retirement rates are quite consistent across contract 
types. 
Although the patterns in the sample statistics are intriguing, they are likely to 
be fraught with omitted variable bias and endogeneity. In the next section, I lay out 
an econometric strategy for identifying the causal effect of workload on contractual 
outcomes. 
Econometric Specification of Workload 
Constructing some consistent measure of workload across agencies and time 
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contracts per officer or dollars obligated per officer are well documented (Black, 
1995; Reed, 2010) and are present here as well. Some contracts are much more 
complex than others, and simply adding up the number of contracts or dollars would 
overstate the load on those agencies that have relatively simple tasks to perform 
and understate the load on those with complex tasks. Since the difficulty of the tasks 
themselves might also directly influence the structure of the procurement terms, any 
results derived from such a biased measure of workload would be a priori suspect. 
Instead of trying to measure work per officer directly, I instead concentrate on the 
effects of increasing or decreasing the number of contracting officers in an agency, 
while controlling for the number and mix of purchases that the officers need to 
manage. 
The mix of procurement problems varies enormously across agencies and 
over time, so some consistent method of measurement must be adduced. Most 
extant measures use some sort of ex-ante weighting scheme among contracts. The 
most well known of these is the Air Force manpower standard for operational 
contracting (AFMS; Air Force Manpower & Innovation Agency [AFIMA], 2001). 
AFMS counts up contractual actions, giving fixed extra weights to actions with 
certain characteristics, including  actions over $100,000, actions during 
expeditionary  deployments, and certain oversight activities.  In all, there are around 
200 individually specified weights. No weight is given to modifications or orders off 
centralized contracts. Other agencies have broadly similar methods of calculating 
workload (for a detailed summary, see Reed [2010]), but implementing such a 
method is not feasible in the present study for two reasons.  First, any ex-ante 
weighting system derived without cross-agency measures of time use would be 
extremely ad hoc. Second, all the extant schemes that could be applied in a cross-
agency framework have workload weights that depend on the very outcomes we are 
interested in exploring: solicitation procedure, dollars obligated, and extent 
competed. Since those choices are equilibrium outcomes, including them in the 
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Given the problems with these ex-ante workload weights, I instead take a 
relatively agnostic approach and try to let the data tell me how work-intensive 
various contracting actions are. For each agency-year, in every regression, I include 
(the log of) the number of contracting officers. I categorize each original action 
according to which of 55 major product/service codes is the primary object of the 
action.  For each product/service class, I count the (log of) the number of original 
contracts for each agency/year combination and include these as 55 separate 
controls, indexed by j.16 Finally, every regression includes measures of contracting-
officer experience, including the fraction with 10–20 years of experience and the 
fraction with over 20 years of experience, agency fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
and product/service fixed effects. 
Intuitively, we want to compare the outcomes for an agency in years when it 
has more contracting officers than we would predict given its contract load, mix, and 
experience to that same agency in years when it has fewer officers, all the while 
adjusting for year-specific factors that are common to all agencies and 
product/service-specific factors. Formally, I estimate the following fixed-effects OLS 
(FE-OLS) equation for contract i in product class p in agency s in year t. 
∑ ∈   (1) 
where employment (officers	) and contract counts (X	) are measured in logs, E  is the 
vector of experience controls,  is the combination of three fixed effects (agency, 
year, and product class), and y is the outcome of interest. Across various contracting 
outcomes, our interest is in estimating β, the effect of expanding the contracting 
workforce on that outcome. Since the variable of interest varies at the agency-year 
level only, standard errors are clustered at that level. 
                                            
16 All the results are robust to also including the number of modifications performed in the office/year 
as an additional measure of work. I prefer the specification without, however, since I worry that the 
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Instrumental-Variable Estimation 
The approach presented in the previous section has an advantage over a 
naive regression of outcomes on contracts per GS-1102 because it adjusts for 
observable predetermined differences in work mix. If the naive measure was biased 
because offices that handled simple products/services hired fewer GS-1102s per 
contract, the problem is solved. There can still be a lot of variation in complexity 
within an agency and product class; this sort of variation would not bias the 
estimates of β unless the unobservable complexity varies over time within an agency 
and is correlated with both employment and contractual outcomes. 
If there are unobservable changes in complexity that occur within agency and 
product class, and those changes are correlated with contracting officer employment 
in the agency, the estimates of β are still biased. Imagine, for example, that the 
mission of the agency changes slightly over time, and it has to write more 
complicated contracts without any significant change to the product mix. To respond 
to this increased complexity, the agency may hire more contracting officers and start 
writing in different contractual terms. In that case, the FE-OLS estimates might find a 
relationship between contracting officer employment and contractual terms, but that 
relationship would not be causal.  In fact, some third factor (mission complexity) is 
driving both. 
To get around this problem, we need to find some intervening variable that 
leads to a shift in the employment of contracting officers that is independent of other 
factors that might affect contractual mix, an instrumental variable. My approach is to 
use retirements by contracting officers as an instrument for employment. 
For this approach to be successful, two conditions must be satisfied.  First, 
variation in contracting-officer retirement rates over time within an agency must have 
some power in explaining variation in employment. Second, conditional on other 
covariates, retirement rates must only relate to contractual form due to their 
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jump or fall because of the change in agency mission, this assumption would not be 
satisfied.  Given the structure of the civil service retirement system, retirement 
seems to be driven, in large part, by the threshold rules that govern pension 
obligations. Retirement rates spike dramatically as employees qualify for full benefits 
at certain age thresholds, which depend on their years of service (Asch, Haider, & 
Zissimopoulos, 2005). As long as this effect is the primary determinant of retirement, 
the instrument will be valid.17 
To check the first assumption, that retirement rates are related to 
employment, I estimate the following regression: 
∈ . 
(2) 
In this regression,  is a dummy for whether there are any retirements in 
agency s in fiscal year t, and  is the log of the percent of GS-1102s who 
retire. Since our interest is in using this relationship to explain variation in contract-
level outcomes, I weight this first-stage regression by the number of original 
definitive contracts in each agency-year. Panel A of Table 3 displays the results of 
these estimations, for the full sample, the big agency subsample, and the services 
subsample. In all three cases there is a strong and robust relationship between 
retirements and employment. The joint hypothesis that both retirement variables are 
equal to zero is rejected with 0.005. 
                                            
17 An alternative approach would be to code age directly, and use the number of contracting officers 
crossing the retirement age threshold as the instrument. This approach would be even more robust to 
endogeneity, since surely managers do not plan the age distribution decades in advance in 
anticipation of change in agency mission. There are two reasons this approach is not feasible with my 
data. First, the age and experience data are available in bins of five years, so I can only observe how 
many contracting officers are between 50–54 years old, and I cannot know how many crossed any 
given year threshold. Second, the age threshold for retirement eligibility is a function of years of 
experience, and I only observed binned experience and binned age, and not binned age x 
experience. I have tried ignoring these problems and simply using the age bins and lagged age bins 
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Table 3. The Relationship Between Retirements, Employment, and Contracts 
 
Notes. Panel A Dependent Variable:  The log of the number of contracting officers. Panel B 
Dependent Variable:  The log of the number of original contracts.  The unit of observation is the 
agency-year, and regressions are weighted by the number of original definitive contracts. In addition 
to the tabulated regressors, the first stage includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 
product/service groups and the log of the number of modifications in that agency-year, agency fixed 
effects, and year fixed effects. The second panel does not include contract workload controls. The full 
sample includes contracts from 85 agencies over 11 years (2000–2010). Standard errors, in 
parenthesis, are clustered by agency. *,**,*** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
To investigate the exclusion restriction, I check in Panel B of Table 3 for one 
obvious sort of reverse causality, that big changes in workload push people to either 
retire or stay around. To test this, I repeat the estimation in Equation 2, with two 
differences. I replace the dependent variable with the log of the total number of 
Full Sample    Big Agencies       Services 
Panel  A (First  Stage):  Predicting  Employment 
Pct.  Retire       ­0.06∗∗∗          ­0.06∗∗∗           ­0.07∗∗∗ 
(0.01)               (0.01)               (0.01) 
Any Retire       ­0.16∗∗∗          ­0.13∗∗∗           ­0.21∗∗∗ 
(0.03)               (0.04)               (0.05) 
Pct.  10–20       ­1.25∗∗∗          ­1.60∗∗∗           ­1.20∗∗∗ 
(0.21)               (0.27)               (0.20) 
Pct.  20+           ­1.55∗∗∗          ­1.66∗∗∗           ­1.70∗∗∗ 
(0.25)               (0.33)               (0.22) 
Joint Test of Retirement Variables 
F-Stat  16.60                13.0                 12.20 
p-value                 0.00                  0.00                  0.00 
Panel  B (Exogeneity):  Predicting  Number of Contracts 
Pct.  Retire        ­0.06∗              ­0.06∗               ­0.03 
(0.03)               (0.03)               (0.04) 
Any Retire          ­0.11              ­0.07               ­0.06 
(0.12)               (0.15)               (0.15) 
C. Officers           0.31                  0.32                  0.28 
(0.21)               (0.28)               (0.18) 
Pct.  10–20         ­0.60              ­0.74               ­0.39 
(0.53)               (0.71)               (0.45) 
Pct.  20+             ­1.01              ­1.13               ­0.60 
(0.75)               (0.97)               (0.51) 
Joint Test of Retirement Variables 
F-Stat                    2.0                    2.2                   0.25 
p-value                 0.14                  0.13                  0.78 
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contracts in the agency-year and replace the controls for product/service mix with 
the log of contracting officer employment, as a time-varying measure of size.  Since 
product counts will be collinear with the new dependent variable, they must be 
dropped, but some measure of scale must be included. In all three samples, 
retirement rates are only weakly related to the number of contractual actions. Since 
the regression includes agency and year fixed effects, the retirement rate in years 
with higher than expected numbers of contractual actions are no different from those 
with lower than expected numbers.  If there is any relationship, it is negative, so 
people are less likely to retire when the agency is busy.  Such a relationship would 
tend to bias toward finding no effect of workload on contracting, since the 
endogenous positive shocks to workload would occur when workload is low. Some 
unobserved change in a qualitative factor of the contracts may still be driving 
retirements, and thereby undermining the identification, but we cannot detect much 
for observable factors. 
Award Type Selection 
As a last step before proceeding to the substantive results, consider whether 
limiting our attention to definitive contracts may lead to selection bias. Table 4 
presents the effect of additional contracting officers on the choice of award type. The 
first two columns present fixed-effect OLS and IV estimates of the effect of adding 
additional contracting officers on a dummy variable indicating whether the award is a 
definitive contract (versus the other two major categories of award: purchase orders 
and delivery orders). Panel A presents the results for the entire sample of original 
contracts. Panel B limits results to original contracts in the big agency sub-sample. 
Panel C limits results to original service contracts. In all three cases, for both OLS 
and IV there is very little evidence of selection. In the largest point estimates, big 
agency or service IV estimates, a 10% increase in the number of contracting officers 
decreases the probability of using a definitive contract by 0.9 of a percentage point. 
None of the IV estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero. The OLS 
estimates are even smaller and of the opposite sign, but are statistically significant at 
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a lot of specialized definitive contracts will require more contracting officers. This 
bias illustrates the need for an IV approach, more generally. 
Table 4. The Effect of Workload on Award Type 
 
Notes. The Dependent variable in all regression is a dummy variable indicating whether the award is 
of the indicated type (definitive contract for specifications 1 and 2, purchase order for specifications 3 
and 4, and delivery order for specifications 5 and 6). Panel A includes all original contractual actions, 
Panel B limits to the big agency sub-sample, and Panel C limits to services. In addition to the 
tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 
product/service groups, product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The 
full sample includes contracts from 85 agencies over up to nine years (2000–2008).  Standard errors, 
in parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year.  *,**,*** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively. 
The final four columns of Table 4 repeat this analysis for purchase orders 
(columns 3 and 4) and delivery orders (columns 5 and 6). Here, there is some 
evidence of substitution between these two types, at least in the case of big 
agencies. Big agencies with an exogenous positive shock to the number of 
Def-OLS   Def-IV   Purch-OLS    Purch-IV    Del-OLS    Del-IV 
Panel  A: Full Sample (n = 1.55M ) 
C. Officers 0.02∗ ­0.05 ­0.05∗∗∗ 0.17 0.03 ­0.12 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.10)
Pct.  10–20 ­0.01 ­0.09 ­0.05 0.22 0.06 ­0.13 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.14)
Pct.  20+ ­0.03 ­0.14 ­0.06 0.31 0.09 ­0.17 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.07) (0.20) (0.08) (0.20)
Panel  B: Big Agencies (n = 1.42M ) 
C. Officers 0.00 ­0.09 ­0.01 0.40∗∗ 0.00 ­0.31∗∗
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.03) (0.17) (0.03) (0.16)
Pct.  10–20 ­0.02 ­0.18 0.00 0.72∗∗ 0.01 ­0.54∗ 
 (0.06) (0.18) (0.10) (0.30) (0.10) (0.29)
Pct.  20+ ­0.04 ­0.22 0.02 0.82∗∗ 0.02 ­0.60∗ 
 (0.07) (0.20) (0.08) (0.33) (0.10) (0.31)
Panel  C: Services (n = 923k) 
C. Officers 0.04∗∗ ­0.09 ­0.04∗∗ 0.11 0.00 ­0.02 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.11)
Pct.  10–20 0.01 ­0.14 0.02 0.20 ­0.03 ­0.05 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14)
Pct.  20+ ­0.07 ­0.28∗ 0.06 0.31 0.01 ­0.03 
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contracting officers make greater use of purchase orders and fewer calls on 
indefinite-delivery contracts. Both of these award types are for relatively simple or 
standardized purchases, but a purchase order allows the contracting office to 
specialize the order to their particular needs, but at the cost of additional time of 
running an individualized procurement (even though it is done under simplified 
procedures).  In contrast, using a delivery order from an extant indefinite delivery 
vehicle may save time at the cost of not quite fitting the agency’s needs perfectly. 
Given this trade-off, the observed pattern of substitution is very sensible and 
consistent with the spirit of the model. 
To summarize, there is some evidence of substitution among simplified award 
types as workload changes, but no evidence of substitution between definitive 
contracts and either of the other two award types. In the analysis that follows, I limit 
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Civilian Results 
Degree of Competition 
Table 5 outlines the estimated effects of decreasing workload on the decision 
to award a contract by competitive mechanisms. For all samples, the OLS results 
would suggest that having more contracting officers is associated with negligible 
differences in the use of competitive contracting mechanisms. Agencies that have 
more contracting officers than we would expect, given their mix of contracts, are no 
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Table 5. The Effect of Workload on Competition 
 
Notes. Dependent variable: Indicator of use of given level of competition. Not available for 
competition is the excluded class. Regressions include original definitive contracts, limited to 39 large 
agencies in specifications 3 and 4, and to service contracts in specifications 5 and 6. In addition to the 
tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 
product/service groups and the log of the number of modifications in that agency-year, 
product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The full sample includes 
contracts from 85 agencies over up to 11 years (2000–2010). Standard errors, in parenthesis, are 
clustered by agency-year.  *,**,*** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
The IV results, however, suggest that these OLS results are likely misleading. 
When we consider exogenous changes in the number of contracting officers, the 
results are dramatically different. Increasing the number contracting officers actually 
increases the use of competitive procurement mechanisms. In particular, increasing 
the number of contracting officers by 10% increases the probability of full-and-open 
OLS IV OLS-Big IV-Big OLS-Serv IV-Serv 
Panel  A: Full and Open Competition 
C. Officers 0.04 0.39∗∗ 0.04 0.41∗∗ 0.03 0.25 
 (0.04) (0.18) (0.05) (0.21) (0.04) (0.19) 
Pct.  10–20 ­0.12 0.34 ­0.18 0.41 ­0.15 0.11 
 (0.10) (0.25) (0.14) (0.35) (0.11) (0.24) 
Pct.  20+ 0.14 0.69∗∗ 0.11 0.70∗∗ 0.06 0.38 
 (0.11) (0.30) (0.15) (0.35) (0.12) (0.28) 
Panel  B: Competition  with Exclusion 
C. Officers 0.02 ­0.51∗∗∗ 0.03 ­0.59∗∗∗ 0.01 ­0.37∗∗
 (0.03) (0.17) (0.05) (0.20) (0.03) (0.16) 
Pct.  10–20 0.18∗∗ ­0.49∗∗ 0.23∗ ­0.78∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ ­0.22 
 (0.08) (0.24) (0.12) (0.34) (0.09) (0.20) 
Pct.  20+ ­0.16∗ ­0.97∗∗∗ ­0.21 ­1.20∗∗∗ ­0.06 ­0.60∗∗
 (0.09) (0.28) (0.13) (0.35) (0.10) (0.25) 
Panel  C: Not Competed 












Pct. 10–20 0.11 0.06 0.18 0.12 0.15∗ 0.12 
  (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.21) (0.09) (0.16) 
Pct. 20+ 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.17∗∗ 0.14 
  (0.09) (0.20) (0.12) (0.22) (0.09) (0.20) 
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competition by about 4 percentage points, decreases the use of competition with 
excluded sources by about 5 percentage points, and decreases the probability that a 
contract is not competed at all by about 1 percentage point. To give a sense of 
magnitudes, about 40% of contracts are fully and openly competed, while about 15% 
are competed after exclusion. The relationship may be slightly weaker for service 
contracts, although the difference is not significant. 
The most plausible reason for the difference between IV and OLS results is 
that the FE-OLS approach has not succeeded in controlling for the differences in 
contract mix within an agency over time. More difficult procurements will both require 
more officers and will be less likely to be fully competed, and we are seeing this 
correlation when agencies respond to a change in the mix of procurement problems 
they face by adjusting their employment of contracting officers. Even if the 
adjustment is imperfect, the correlation could still move in the observed direction.  
Only when armed with a shock to employment, such as a spate of retirements, can 
the true effect of exogenous changes in the number of contracting officers be 
uncovered. 
Having experienced contracting officers seems to have a similar effect as 
having more contracting officers. A 10% increase in the number of very experienced 
(20+ years of experience) officers is associated with a 7% increase in the probability 
of full-and-open competition, with a concomitant reduction in the use of competition 
with exclusion. This pattern is evidence for the very reasonable idea that more 
experienced contracting officers may be more efficient in writing contracts and 
running competitions, perhaps due to the accumulation of specific human capital. 
Pricing Structure 
Table 6 outlines the estimated effects of decreasing workload on the pricing 
structure chosen by the contracting officer. For all samples, the OLS results would 
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price contracting. Agencies that have more contracting officers than we would 
expect, given their mix of contracts, are more likely to use firm-fixed-price contracts. 
Table 6. The Effect of Workload on Contract Pricing 
 
Notes. Dependent variable: Indicator of use of firm-fixed-price contract. Regressions include original 
definitive contracts, limited to 39 large agencies in specifications 3 and 4, and to service contracts in 
specifications 5 and 6. In addition to the tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of 
the number of original contracts in 55 product/service groups and the log of the number of 
modifications in that agency-year, product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects, and year fixed 
effects. The full sample includes contracts from 85 agencies over up to 11 years (2000–2010). 
Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year. *,**,*** represent significance at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The IV results, in this case, suggest that these OLS results are approximately 
correct. When we consider exogenous changes in the number of contracting 
officers, the results are qualitatively quite similar to the OLS results, for the most 
part.  Increasing the number contracting officers increases the use of fixed-price 
contracts. In particular, increasing the number of contracting officers by 10%, 
increases the probability of using a firm-fixed- price contract by about 1 percentage 
point.  On average, about 85% of contracts in the sample are firm-fixed-price 
contracts. There is little evidence for a difference between IV and OLS results.  
Perhaps agencies are not as responsive to employment needs that result in changes 
in pricing terms as they are in responding to employment needs that would result in 
changes in the use of competitive procurement practices. 
Finally, just as in the case of competition, experienced contracting officers 
affect pricing terms in the same manner as more contracting officers do. An officer 
OLS        IV      OLS-Big   IV-Big    OLS-Serv    IV-Serv 
Use of Firm Fixed-Price  Contracts 
C. Officers 0.07∗∗∗ 0.11 0.13∗∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.09) 
Pct. 10–20 0.15∗ 0.19 0.36∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.10 0.07 
  (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.19) (0.08) (0.14) 
Pct. 20+ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.12 
  (0.07) (0.14) (0.09) (0.17) (0.08) (0.14) 
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with a more experienced staff of contracting officers uses significantly more firm-
fixed-price contracts. Again, this is consistent with experienced officers doing a 
better job of writing complete contracts. 
Obligations 
Table 7 outlines the estimated effects of decreasing workload on the initial 
and final amount obligated on the contract, where final obligations take into account 
all later adjustments due to modification. The OLS results suggest that having more 
contracting officers is associated with lower initial and final obligations, on average. 
The IV results, in this case, again suggest that these OLS results are approximately 
correct. Increasing the number of contracting officers lowers the initial and final 
dollar cost of the contract.  In particular, increasing the number of contracting officers 
by 10% lowers the expected final obligation by between 2–4%.  The effect on initial 
obligations is in the same direction and about half to two-thirds the size. 
Table 7. The Effect of Workload on Obligations 
 
Notes. Dependent variable: The natural log of the cost of obligations, measured in real 2009 dollars.  
Regressions include original definitive contracts, limited to 39 large agencies in specifications 3 and 
4, and to service contracts in specifications 5 and 6. In addition to the tabulated regressors, each 
OLS          IV      OLS-Big    IV-Big    OLS-Serv    IV-Serv 
Panel  A: Total  Dollars Obligated 












Pct.  10–20 ­0.39 ­0.43 ­0.79∗∗ ­0.69 ­0.60∗∗ ­0.64 
 (0.24) (0.52) (0.33) (0.71) (0.25) (0.48) 
Pct.  20+ ­0.37 ­0.42 ­0.68∗∗ ­0.59 ­0.51∗∗ ­0.56 
 (0.23) (0.60) (0.29) (0.70) (0.24) (0.56) 
Panel  B: Initial  Dollars Obligated 












Pct. 10–20 ­0.09 ­0.23 ­0.42 ­0.30 ­0.24 ­0.35 
  (0.20) (0.43) (0.28) (0.59) (0.20) (0.38) 
Pct. 20+ ­0.01 ­0.18 ­0.13 ­0.02 ­0.13 ­0.26 
  (0.19) (0.50) (0.24) (0.57) (0.19) (0.44) 
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specification includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 product/service groups and the 
log of the number of modifications in that agency-year, product/service fixed effects, agency fixed 
effects, and year fixed effects. The full sample includes contracts from 85 agencies over 
approximately 11 years (2000–2010). Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year.  
*,**,*** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
This could involve a lot of money. Take the smallest estimate, with an 
elasticity of about −0.2. Weighting by contracts, the average agency has about 444 
contracting officers and handled about 1,765 original definitive contracts over the 
sample period with an average final obligation of about $2.41 million in 2009 dollars. 
If they had increased their workforce to 488 officers, the total obligations would have 
fallen to about $2.36 million per contract, a savings of about $88.2 million over the 
11-year period. A rough estimate of $150,000 per contracting officer per year implies 
a net savings of about $15.5 million dollars per agency on original definitive 
contracts. Note, this calculation excludes any concomitant effects on obligations for 
other contract types, but I have no reason to suspect they would move in the 
opposite direction. 
Once again, more experienced officers have a similar relationship to 
contracting outcomes as having more contracting officers. Offices with more 
experienced contracting officers obligated less money, overall, although the 
relationship is only statistically significant in the case of the OLS estimates in big 
agencies. 
Modifications 
Table 8 outlines the estimated effects of decreasing workload on the 
presence and number of substantive modifications or terminations. For this analysis 
only, I limit the sample to contracts written before 2009, since enough time must 
pass to observe any modifications. For all three samples, the OLS results would 
suggest that having more contracting officers is not robustly associated with ex-post 
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Table 8. The Effect of Workload on Substantive Modifications 
 
Notes. Panel A Dependent Variable: Indicator of a subsequent substantive modification. Panel B 
Dependent Variable: Indicator of a contractual termination. Panel C Dependent Variable: the log of 
one plus the number of substantive modifications.  Regressions include original definitive contracts, 
limited to 39 large agencies in specifications 3 and 4, and to service contracts in specifications 5 and 
6. In addition to the tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of the number of original 
contracts in 55 product/service groups and the log of the number of modifications in that agency-year, 
product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The full sample includes 
contracts from 85 agencies over up to nine years (2000–2008). Standard errors, in parenthesis, are 
clustered by agency-year.  *,**,*** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
OLS           IV         OLS-Big    IV-Big    OLS-Serv    IV-Serv 
Panel  A: Any Substantive Modifications 
C. Officers ­0.02 ­0.12 0.03 ­0.07 ­0.06∗ ­0.24∗ 
 (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.18) (0.03) (0.13) 
Pct.  10–20 ­0.20∗∗ ­0.30∗ ­0.12 ­0.27 ­0.21∗ ­0.38∗∗ 
 (0.10) (0.18) (0.15) (0.28) (0.11) (0.17) 
Pct.  20+ ­0.16 ­0.28 ­0.09 ­0.22 ­0.20∗ ­0.40∗∗ 
 (0.10) (0.20) (0.13) (0.25) (0.11) (0.19) 
Panel  B: Termination 












Pct.  10–20 ­0.03∗∗ ­0.06∗∗∗ ­0.04∗∗∗ ­0.08∗∗ ­0.03∗∗∗ ­0.07∗∗∗
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) 
Pct.  20+ ­0.01 ­0.05∗∗ ­0.03∗∗∗ ­0.06∗∗ ­0.02 ­0.06∗∗ 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Panel  C: Number of Substantive Modifications 
C. Officers ­0.05 ­0.23 0.00 ­0.17 ­0.09∗∗ ­0.37∗ 
 (0.04) (0.21) (0.06) (0.27) (0.05) (0.21) 
Pct. 10–20 ­0.23 ­0.43∗ ­0.18 ­0.42 ­0.24 ­0.50∗ 
  (0.15) (0.26) (0.22) (0.42) (0.17) (0.26) 
Pct. 20+ ­0.01 ­0.24 0.07 ­0.14 0.01 ­0.29 
  (0.14) (0.29) (0.18) (0.37) (0.16) (0.28) 
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Table 9. Average Total Contract Load, GS-1102 Employment, and Initial 
Obligation ($2009) for Big Agencies 
 
Notes. Agencies with at least 500 original definitive contracts. GS-1102 is the average stock of 
contracting officers at the start of the fiscal year.  Contracts is the total number of original definitive 
contracts in the sample. Obligation is the average obligation for original definitive contracts. 
Agency GS-1102s Avg. Obligation  ($M2009) Contracts 
Dept of VA 1001.2  0.46 39692
FSS + FTS (Joint) 761.7  0.37 966
NASA 724.0  0.62 7859
Fed.  Supply Serv. (Pre-Merger) 588.2  0.25 914
Public Building Serv. 574.8  1.50 9946
Dept of Energy 518.6  4.56 2080
Bureau  of Prisons 328.0  1.93 2799
NIH 322.3  1.48 3517
Coast Guard 303.9  0.63 3849
IRS 284.6  0.44 729
Forest  Service 274.8  0.24 14410
National  Park  Service 214.6  0.66 5128
Fed.  Tech Service (Pre-Merger) 181.6  0.97 1345
State  Dept. 133.9  2.13 5787
US Customs  Service 120.8  1.30 538
Interior-  OPMB 117.5  0.55 2374
FEMA 99.8  4.21 557
Bureau  of Reclamation 92.9  1.00 1210
HUD 92.5  1.43 1511
Social Sec. Admin. 92.5  0.79 542
NOAA 92.4  0.62 2289
CDC 89.6  2.58 1878
Natural  Res. Conserv.  Serv. 86.9  0.40 1228
Bureau  of Land Management 72.2  0.33 2197
Fish and Wildlife 70.1  0.39 2147
FBI 69.6  0.86 1066
Dept of Educatioj 59.6  1.50 533
Farm  Service Agency 59.1  1.00 8536
Ag. Research Serv. 56.4  0.69 1192
Indian  Affairs 54.2  0.64 1263
Geological Survey 53.7  0.33 631
FDA 53.6  0.41 950
”DOJ-Offices, Boards, and Div.” 40.3  0.29 6116
Minerals Management Serv. 37.3  0.60 568
Fed.  Highway Admin 35.7  3.42 1192
NIST 30.5  1.09 616
Labor- ETA 23.7  2.34 661
OPM 17.7  1.17 710
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The IV results, by contrast, show significant effects of workload on contract 
terminations in all three samples. Increasing the number of contracting officers by 
about 10% when the original contract is signed decreases the probability that the 
contract is later terminated by about 0.4 percentage points, on a mean of less than 
1%. 
The IV results for modifications are more mixed. For service contracts, having 
more contracting officers leads to fewer modification, along both the extensive and 
intensive margins. Specifically, increasing the number of contracting officers by 10%, 
decreases the probability of modification by about 2.5 percentage points, and 
decreases the expected number of modifications by about 3.7%. To judge the size of 
these effects, about 43% of service contracts in the sample are modified at some 
point, and the average service contract has about 1.5 modifications.  The sign of the 
IV estimates in the other subsamples is also negative, but these estimates are not 
statistically different from zero. 
Consistent with the predictions of the model, less busy agencies do a better 
job at foreseeing contingencies in the original contract and, thereby, limiting the 
need for ex-post renegotiation or termination. This relationship is particularly 
apparent in the case of service contracts, for which the costs of contractual 
completeness may be particularly high. 
In this final contractual characteristic, we again see the pattern of experience 
affecting outcomes in the same way that additional staff does.  An agency with more 
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Summary of Civilian Analysis 
This section of the paper explored one driver of incomplete contracting, 
workload, and the numerous effects of incomplete contracting on other contracting 
and procurement provisions.  As workload increases, contracting officers will 
optimally write less complete contracts. Recognizing that renegotiation is more likely 
with less complete contracts, they will also alter the method of competition and 
pricing structure. In particular, they will lean away from full-and-open competition 
and away from firm-fixed-price contracts. They will also end up obligating more 
money, in expectation. 
Although this is not the first paper to identify similar effects of contractual 
incompleteness on contracting and procurement terms, it is unique in its scope and 
method of identification. Most papers have focused on a single industry and 
identified variations in completeness by looking for differences in underlying 
complexity. I, instead, control for complexity and industry, and look at variation in 
completeness induced by exogenous differences in contracting-officer workload.  
Despite this very different approach, my results are quite consistent with the 
literature. This consistency is important, since the potential biases are very different 
in the two approaches. For the extant literature, researchers worry that complexity 
may have impacts on contractual forms that are not mediated by incompleteness; for 
this paper, we worry that workload may have impacts of contractual form that are not 
mediated by incompleteness. But unless these biases are coincidentally in the same 
direction for each contractual term, in both approaches, the consistent findings 
should make us feel more confident about both. 
Although a lot is known about the determination of contractual forms, in 
general, very little work has looked into the effects of workload. Given the dramatic 
changes in the amount of contracting the federal government has done over the last 
decade, and the relatively small change in the contracting workforce, understanding 
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incomplete contracting framework is a useful way to thinking about the effects of 
workload. Furthermore, we quantified some of the benefits of increasing the number 
of contracting officers (decreasing workload). 
These results are relevant beyond their importance for procurement policy. In 
a private firm, we would probably expect that contracting managers are aware of the 
trade-off identified here and choose the size of the contracting to maximize expected 
profits. But experienced contracting officers are probably a fixed resource in the 
short run, so we might expect there to be important short-run consequences of 
unexpected shocks to contracting workload. If the economic forces identified here 
apply in that circumstance too, then firms should respond to sudden increases in 
procurement needs by increasing their reliance on cost-plus and negotiated 
contracts, in the short run.  Of course, over time they will appropriately re-balance 
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Defense contracting is characterized by a high level of uncertainty due to 
unpredictable changes in both technology and demand. Writing and managing well-
specified contracts in this uncertain environment is necessarily time consuming;  
contracting officers must allocate their limited time-budget among the contracting 
tasks at hand.  If contracting officers’ responsibilities expand to include additional 
tasks, then they must decrease the average amount of time spent on each task, 
constraining them to leave some potential eventualities unaddressed. In this paper, 
we investigate how changes in the workload of contracting officers relate to the 
equilibrium level of contractual completeness and the use of other procurement 
terms including award type, pricing structure, the use of competition, the probability 
of renegotiation, and the final price paid. 
After briefly outlining the procurement process in the Department of Defense 
(DoD), we review a model from the section titled Modeling the Procurement Process 
that extends Bajari and Tadelis (2001) to understand how varying workload affects 
the choice of contractual completeness and contractual terms. This model predicts 
that busier contracting officers write less-complete contracts, so the risk of 
renegotiation increases as fewer contingencies are fully specified. The increased 
need for contract modifications raises the cost of fixed-price contracts, so higher 
workload causes contracting officers to shift to more flexible cost-plus contracts. The 
higher risk of renegotiation also means that the benefit of competitive acquisitions 
falls because competition only identifies the most efficient contractor for the original 
contract specification. As a result, the model predicts that busier contractors shift to 
less competitive acquisitions procedures. All of these individual effects of higher 
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reduced use of competitive acquisitions procedures—increase the expected price of 
any given project. 
In line with this model, we analyze a sample of 4.6 million contracts from a 
panel of 32 DoD procurement offices over the years 2005–2010. Consistent with the 
model, we find that exogenous increases in contracting officer workload that 
increase the cost of contractual completeness decrease the use of competition, 
increase the probability of renegotiation, and increase the total costs of procurement.  
Curiously, we find that higher workload increases the use of firm-fixed-price 
contracts. In addition, we find that higher workloads induce contracting officers to 
use more delivery orders (calls on an existing contract) and fewer new definitive 
contracts. 
One subset of procurement that has received a lot of attention in recent years 
is contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The congressionally appointed 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC; 2011) 
estimates that between $31 billion and $60 billion were lost to waste and fraud in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. In their report on wartime contracting, the CWC (2011) 
attributes part of this waste and fraud to an insufficient number of acquisitions 
personnel, stating, “agencies continue to lack sufficient staff and resources to enable 
adequate management of all aspects of contingency contracting. (p. 11)” In light of 
these concerns, we separately examine the impact of changing workloads on a 
subsample of contracts procured in Iraq and Afghanistan.  We find that higher 
workloads do have important implications for the procurement terms of these 
contingency contracts, but the effects on contingency contracts are not dissimilar to 
the effects of increased workload on the remainder of (non-contingency) contracts. 
In fact, with the exception of competition, changes in workload have a lesser effect 
on the procurements terms for contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan than 
they do for other contracts. Hence, the personnel problems for Iraq and Afghanistan 
contracts identified by the CWC may be even more important for the domestic 
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The acquisitions community has expressed concern about the growth of 
contracting straining the capacity of the acquisitions workforce.  The DoD’s 
procurement obligations have increased from $270.7 billion in FY2005 to $367.7 
billion in FY2010, a 36% increase over these six years (FPDS, 2011). In contrast, 
the DoD’s contracting workforce grew from 26,025 in FY2005 to 29,792 in FY2010—
an increase of only 14% over the same six-year period (USD, AT&L, 2010) 
Moreover, relative to the DoD civilian workforce as a whole, the civilian acquisitions 
workforce has a disproportionate share of employees near or at full retirement 
eligibility.18 
The acquisitions community worries that the increasingly strained contracting 
workforce will be unable to adequately specify and manage contracts, leading to 
increased susceptibility to fraud, reduced bargaining power in negotiations, and 
excessive dependence on private contractors. Rau and Stambersky (2009) report 
that less than 15% of surveyed senior contracting officers at the Army Contracting 
Command believed that there were sufficient acquisition management positions in 
their installation, and only 23% believed that contractor performance on service 
contracts received the proper level of oversight. Chapter 5 of the Report of the 
Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the 
United States Congress (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007) reports that “inadequacy 
in the acquisition workforce” wastes government resources and produces 
unsatisfactory contractual outcomes.19  We address these concerns in this paper 
and provide evidence for the consequences of limited contracting capacity on 
acquisitions outcomes. 
                                            
18 See Gates et al. (2008) for a complete analysis of these trends in the Department of Defense 
acquisitions workforce. 
19 See also the large body of work by the GAO: High-Risk Series: An Update (2005a); DoD 
Acquisitions: Contracting for Better Outcomes (2006c); Contract Management: DoD Vulnerabilities to 
Contracting Fraud, Waste and Abuse (2006b); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major 
Weapon Programs (2006a); Defense Acquisitions: DoD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive 
Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes (2005c); Defense Management: DoD Needs to 
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We follow the approach introduced above, in the civilian analysis, by taking 
advantage of variation in the workload of contracting officers as a shifter of the cost 
of contractual completeness to estimate the relationship between contract specificity 
and the selection of contractual terms. Our results are generally consistent with 
those results as well as the broader literature. 
In the rest of this section, we put the paper in context, both in terms of the 
existing literature and the policy environment. In the section A Review of the 
Procurement Model, we briefly review the model from the civilian analysis  that 
predicts the effects of workload on contractual completeness and procurement 
terms. In the section DoD Data and Methodology, we discuss the data and the 
empirical approach.  In the section DoD Results, we present the empirical results, 
and in the section Summary of DoD Analysis and Conclusion, we conclude our 
analysis. 
The DoD Procurement Process 
The DoD’s basic procurement process progresses in three stages. The 
process begins with the recognition of an agency need and the development of a 
procurement strategy intended to meet the need.  It continues with the solicitation 
and award stage, and ends with the contract management and closeout stage.20  In 
highly uncertain environments, the DoD uses a modified version of this basic 
procurement process. We characterize the basic three-stage procurement process 
in this section and describe two common modifications of this process in the section 
“Complex Contracting Environments.” 
In the first stage, the agency determines that is has a need for a product (or 
service) that it cannot or does not wish to produce with “in-house” resources. A 
contracting officer employed with the agency then determines the optimal strategy 
                                            
20 Adapted from Contracting Officers Technical Representative (COTR) Training Blueprint (Federal 
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for successfully procuring the desired product within the constraints of authorizing 
legislation, current market conditions, and the requirements of both the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2012) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS, 2010). The agency must decide whether and how to compete 
the contract, the preferred pricing terms, and whether the contract will be for a 
definitive quantity or some indefinite delivery vehicle. 
After the agency determines the method of procurement and contractual form, 
it solicits bids from potential suppliers. The agency uses various means, including 
the Federal Business Opportunities website, to request bids from potential 
contractors,.  The request for bids includes a description of the product or service 
the agency wishes to purchase, the contractors that are allowed to submit an offer, 
the form that these offers should take, and how the agency intends to evaluate the 
offers. As dictated by the agency’s solicitation, contractors may respond with a 
simple price bid, a more complicated proposal, or even engage in bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations with the agency that include exchanges of proposals. The 
agency evaluates these proposals according to the provisions in the solicitation and 
an award is made. 
Once the contract is awarded, production begins, and the agency begins the 
contract management stage.  The agency oversees production, inspecting for 
quality, adherence to specifications, and auditing costs when appropriate. If 
unforeseen contingencies arise during production, the agency may choose to modify 
the original contract. These modifications may take the form of simple unilateral 
changes to the specifications or, in the case of significant changes, may require 
bilateral negotiations to determine an equitable adjustment of pricing. Finally, the 
contract is ended, either because the contract terms were fulfilled or because the 
agency terminated the contract for one of many possible reasons, including 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 56 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Complex Contracting Environments 
When the procurement environment is particularly complex, the DoD uses a 
modified form of the procurement process described in the previous section. There 
are two main forms this advanced process can take: multi-stage procurements and 
umbrella contracts. 
For complex items with large economies of scale, such as weapons systems, 
the DoD typically uses multi-stage procurements that repeat the basic procurement 
process described previously in each stage. The following discussion of multiple-
stage contracts is adapted largely from Rogerson (1995) who describes three 
procurement phases in a product life cycle. The first stage is a design stage in which 
the agency awards cost-plus contracts to several firms who research and develop 
competing designs. The design stage has the most competition of the three stages, 
because, even though uncertainty about the final product is high, economies of scale 
are relatively low and the competition in research and development enables the 
agency to identify the best design. At the end of the design phase, the agency 
selects the two best designs to continue to the sole-source selection phase. 
In the sole-source selection stage, the remaining two firms build prototypes, 
present final design plans, and submit bids for the initial production. Because 
relatively small quantities of most weapons systems are ever purchased, it is usually 
unprofitable for more than one firm to produce a particular weapon system. 
Therefore, at the conclusion of this stage, this agency will generally award 
production rights to only one firm. 
The final phase of weapons procurement is the production stage. Even at this 
stage, large uncertainties persist because of the probable changes in both 
technology and the DoD’s demand for the product, making long-term fixed-price 
production contracts impractical. Instead, the DoD typically relies on repeated fixed-
price contracts that are signed for one year of production at a time. Because of the 
large economies of scale, these contracts are almost always negotiated in a sole-
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government typically bases prices for these production contracts on historical and 
projected costs with the inclusion of a “profit” term. Moreover, the Truth in 
Negotiations Act (TINA, 1962, § 2306a) requires contractors to submit “current 
accurate and complete” cost estimates during negotiations of the contracted price. 
The combination of cost-based pricing and TINA means that small cost savings will 
only benefit contractors for one year before the cost savings are priced into the next 
contract, and unprecedentedly large cost savings may open the contractor up to 
prosecution for hiding information and require them to refund these savings back to 
the DoD. In this environment, fixed-price contracts may not have any advantage 
over cost-plus contracts: The contractor has little incentive to provide cost-saving 
effort, and high uncertainty makes renegotiation likely. 
The second major modified procurement form is the use of umbrella 
contracts. When an agency knows it will need a large quantity of some relatively 
standardized service or product, but the quantity is unknown, the agency may 
choose to write an indefinite delivery vehicle (IDV) which specifies basic information 
about the desired good or service. The IDV then acts as a framework for future 
contracts. When the agency determines it needs the product or service, it makes a 
“call” on the corresponding IDV, filling in the incremental details such as time, place, 
and manner of delivery. Agencies can make repeated calls on the same IDV. The 
advantage of an IDV is the ability to shortcut several stages in the procurement 
process; contracting officers do not have to re-specify and award the contract 
repeatedly for the same service. However, the IDV may not be well-specified for 
every circumstance that generates a call on it, potentially creating the need for costly 
modifications. One prominent example of an IDV is the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP) providing broad logistics support to the U.S. Army, including 
delivery of food supplies, postal services, and facilities maintenance.  The most 
recent iteration, LOGCAP IV, was awarded in 2007 to three firms with a maximum 
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Contracting Officers 
The primary DoD agents responsible for overseeing this procurement process 
are civil service employees in the occupational series GS-1102, generally referred to 
as contracting officers. The Position Classification Standard for the Contracting 
Series (OPM, 1983) describes their role as follows: 
This series includes positions that manage, supervise, perform, or develop 
policies and procedures for professional work involving the procurement of 
supplies, services, construction, or research and development using formal 
advertising or negotiation procedures; the evaluation of contract price 
proposals; and the administration or termination and close out of contracts. 
The work requires knowledge of the legislation, regulations, and methods 
used in contracting; and knowledge of business and industry practices, 
sources of supply, cost factors, and requirements characteristics. 
There are a number of military and civilian support personnel that aid these 
contracting officers in the procurement process, including purchasing officers (GS-
1105s, who concentrate on simplified acquisitions), procurement clerical and 
assistance series employees (GS-1106s, who provide clerical support), and 
contracting officer representatives and contracting officer technical representatives 
(various series who develop the contracts’ technical requirements and determine if a 
contractor meets them).  We use only ceteris paribus variation in the number of the 
civilian (GS-1102) contracting officers to measure changes in workload. 
In the next section, we describe a model of the procurement that trace the 
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A Review of the Procurement Model 
This section’s predictions about the effect of workload on contractual 
completeness and procurement terms are derived from the model from the civilian 
analysis that extends the analysis in Bajari and Tadelis (2001) of the choice between 
fixed-price and cost-plus contracts to also include the choice between competition 
and negotiation. We repeat the basic results here for the reader interested only in 
the DoD. 
In our model of the procurement process, the primary agent is a contracting 
officer who maximizes a utility function that depends on three elements: the value of 
the product or service, net of payments to the contractor; the cost of specifying 
contractual contingencies; and the cost of running a procurement competition.21 The 
contracting officer chooses three variable characteristics of the contract:  the level of 
contractual completeness, the pricing terms of the contract (i.e., fixed-price or cost-
plus), and whether to run an open competition or to engage in negotiations with a 
single firm. 
The value the contracting officer places on the product to be procured is 
exogenous and not affected by contracting terms. The final payment is dependent 
on the initial obligation, pricing terms, and the probability of renegotiation.  The 
contracting officer has a choice of specifying a level of contractual completeness to 
cover potential contingencies:  higher levels of contractual completeness reduce the 
probability that the contracting officer will have to engage in post-award 
renegotiations for off-contract performance. The contracting officer bears an 
exogenously given level of workload on other projects. When his workload 
increases, his opportunity cost of more fully specifying the current contract also 
increases. 
                                            
21 The contracting officer need not value the product or its price at the same rate as his political 
principal for the comparative statics to hold. All that is required is that he would prefer paying less to 
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In the event that a contract requires modification after production has started, 
the contracting officer faces two potential increases in cost.  First, modifications 
should increase production costs on average since some costs are likely to be 
nonrecoverable. Second, if the contracting officer chooses to award a fixed-price 
contract, then he must specify a modified contract and negotiate a new payment for 
this modified contract. We assume that the contracting officer must bear a friction 
cost associated with this respecification and renegotiation of a fixed-price contract.22 
The primary purpose of this model is to predict the impact of an exogenous 
shift in the cost of contractual completeness induced by a change in the contracting 
officer’s workload. An increase in a contracting officer’s workload increases the 
marginal cost of completeness, necessarily reducing the equilibrium level of 
contractual completeness. This reduction of the optimal completeness will have 
important effects on the contracting officer’s other equilibrium choices as well as his 
final financial outlay. 
Consider first, contracting officers choice between fixed-price and cost-plus 
contracts. The advantage of a fixed-price contract is the incentive it creates for 
contractors to efficiently provide non-contractible cost-reducing effort, since the 
contractor is the residual claimant on any cost savings. In contrast, cost-plus 
contracts do not produce incentives for cost-saving effort, since any reduction in 
costs will result in an equal reduction in payment to the contractor. Since the 
contractor and contracting officer anticipate this cost-saving effort, the initial 
obligation under a fixed-price contract will be lower than with a cost-plus contract.  
The advantage of cost-plus contracts is the ease of renegotiation when unspecified 
contingencies arise. Rather than negotiating a new price for a modified contract, the 
contracting officer only needs to compensate the contractor for additional costs 
according to the terms of the original contract. If a contract were fully specified so 
that there would be no possibility of modification, the contracting officer would 
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always prefer a fixed-price contract. However, as increasing workload induces the 
contracting officer to specify less and less of the contract, the ease of renegotiation 
from cost-plus contracts becomes more attractive. At some threshold of 
incompleteness, cost-plus contracts may become optimal. 
Compare, next, the contracting officer’s choice between open competition and 
single-source negotiation.  The advantage of competition is the ability to select an 
ex-ante more efficient contractor. However, the advantage of competition disappears 
when modification is certain, since the ex-ante more efficient contractor may not 
have the lowest costs on the modified contract.  The advantage of negotiation is the 
convenience to forgo the time and expense of conducting an open competitive 
procurement. As contracts become less and less complete, the benefits of 
competition diminish without any decline in the cost of running a competition (if 
anything, the time cost has increased).  Hence, a higher workload that reduces 
completeness will make single-source negotiations more appealing. 
Combining these results, we see that an exogenous increase in workload will 
induce the contracting officer to choose to write a less complete contract and 
increase his use of cost-plus contracts and single-source negotiations.  These 
choices have important ramifications for both the initial contracted obligation and the 
final outlays. The initial price is affected by both the pricing terms and the extent the 
contract is competed. As completeness falls, the increased use of cost-plus 
contracts will result in fewer cost-saving efforts and the increased use of negotiation 
will reduce the probability that the contracting officer will select the ex-ante most 
efficient contractor. Both of these effects will tend to increase the initial contracted 
price. 
The final outlay depends on the initial price and the probability of 
renegotiation.  In the absence of any modification, the final outlay approximately 
equals the initial price, but reduced contractual completeness increases the 
probability that the contract will need to be modified.  Since some costs are non-
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higher final outlays.  Finally, the higher probability of modification means that even 
when the contracting officer still prefers to use a fixed-price contract, he has a higher 
probability of having to bear the cost of renegotiation frictions, increasing the 
expected final outlays. In summary, an exogenous increase in workload which 
decreases the equilibrium level of completeness increases the expected final outlays 
due to a higher initial price, reduced cost-saving efforts from increased used of cost-
plus contracts, and increased probability of renegotiation which increases both 
expected production costs and expected contracting costs. 
In the empirical analysis presented in the next section, we investigate and find 
evidence for the predicted effects of increased workload on the use of competition, 
the probability of renegotiation,  initial obligations, and final outlays. The results on 
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DoD Data and Methodology 
We use a large public database of government contracts to build measures of 
workload and contractual/procurement terms. The contract data consist of every 
nonclassified transaction from FY2005 to FY2010 above a reporting threshold of 
$3,00023 for 32 DoD contracting offices, about 6.9 million actions in all.24 Gathered 
from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS-NG), through 
www.usaspending.gov, the contract data include procurement contract transactions 
reported directly through the contract-writing systems of the constituent agencies. 
Each initial government obligation appears exactly once (4.6 million), as does every 
modification of a reported contract (2.3 million). For each contract, the FPDS-NG 
reports a broad range of information about the contracting parties, the contractual 
terms, the method of procurement, and the place of performance. The particular 
provisions that form the basis for the analysis are discussed in detail in the following 
analysis. 
We measure the number of contracting officers in an agency by counting the 
number of GS-1102s. The data on GS-1102 employment in each contracting agency 
in each fiscal year comes from the Office of Personnel Management’s Central 
Personnel Data File.  It reports the number of civilian contracting officers in each 
agency at the end of each fiscal year by years of experience in that agency. 
Unfortunately, analysis of contracting in defense agencies has several 
complications that are not present for a similar analysis of civilian agencies. First, 
compared to civilian agencies, a larger share of defense contracts are classified for 
reasons of national security and are thus unreported. This missing-data issue has 
                                            
23 Original contracts below the $3,000 reporting threshold are known as “micropurchases,” and are 
exempted from a number of competition and reporting requirements. We drop all reported original 
contracts below this threshold, because reporting rates of micropurchases may adjust with workload. 
24 This consists of every DoD agency/sub-agency that reports non-zero GS-1102s to the OPM and 
more than 300 original definitive contractual actions to the FPDS-NG, with a few exceptions. See 
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two implications for our analysis. First, we can only estimate effects for non-
classified contracts and can say nothing concrete about whether these effects would 
also hold for classified contracts.  Second, when estimating workload, we can only 
imperfectly control for the work on classified contracts. Contract counts for these 
classified contracts are not available, nor is budgetary information at the agency 
level. Instead, we control for the fraction of the branch procurement budget that is 
classified (from the OMB analysis of the DoD budget), where Army, Navy, and Air 
Force agencies are assigned the fraction for their branch, and non-branch agencies 
are assigned the fraction classified of the non-branch DoD budget.25 
Second, procurement work in some defense agencies is shared with career 
military officers, but the Central Personnel Data File includes only civilian contracting 
officers. The only publicly available data we can find on this question is available at 
the branch level at a single point of time (OUSD AT&L, 2010). Since our regression 
will include agency fixed effects, a control like that would be dropped. 
Finally, the contracts data from the FPDS-NG and the employment data from 
the Central Personnel Data File are reported at different levels within the DoD’s 
hierarchy. At the highest level, the DoD is divided into branches (e.g., Navy). These 
branches are subdivided into agencies (e.g., Naval Air Systems Command).  Each 
of these agencies can be further subdivided into individual contracting offices. The 
FPDS-NG reports both the branch and the six-digit DoD Activity Address Code 
(DoDAAC) of the contracting office that issues each contract but not the agency to 
which the contracting office belongs. The Central Personnel Data File reports 
employment of contracting officers only at the levels of the branch and the agency. 
To match the contracts to the appropriate employment information, we use the 
Defense Automatic Addressing System Inquiry System26 (DAASINQ) to identify the 
agency to which each contracting office belongs. For example, the FPDS-NG reports 
                                            
25 The appropriate data are available from the Defense Manpower Data Center, we believe, but they 
are not publicly available, and we have not been able to gain access to them. 
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contracts from a contracting office with DoDAAC N65886 in the Navy. According to 
DAASINQ, N65886 is the DoDAAC of the Fleet Readiness Center Southeast which 
belongs to the agency Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). Consequently, we 
assign all contracts with DoDAAC N65886 to NAVAIR. We repeat this process for all 
contracts in the Navy, Army, and Air Force.27 Table 10 lists additional details about 
these corresponding agencies, including their distribution of contracts, number of 
contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan, and number of contracting officers. 
                                            
27 FPDS-NG reports the agency instead of the branch for contracts issued by all independent DoD 
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Table 10. Agencies in DoD Sample 
 
Contractual Types and Terms 
Contractual characteristics vary immensely, even within a single agency.  
These contract characteristics can be divided into two main subsets: features over 
which contracting officers have little discretion and features over which contracting 
officers have more discretion. For example, contracting officers have little discretion 
over contract features such as product class, as these features are primarily 
Agency Name Pct.  Purch Pct.  Deliv. Pct.  Def. I or A Contracts C. Off.
U.S. AF, EU 48.2 48.9 2.9 11 22, 809 55
Air Ed.  and Training 39.2 57.2 3.6 106 46, 169 350
HW, Air Force Res. 30.5 61.1 8.4 0 6, 776 102
PacAir 35.4 62.0 2.6 0 22, 805 93
Air Combat 38.2 57.0 4.8 0 33, 456 298
AF Materiel 32.1 58.7 9.2 357 157, 565 2455
Space Command 24.8 68.4 6.8 0 19, 139 540
Air Force, Wash. 27.4 65.7 6.9 4 6, 678 60
ACA 39.7 55.4 4.8 391 285, 409 1351
Army Acq. Support 66.3 15.8 17.9 43, 775 43, 776 256
Army Corps of Eng. 32.7 61.7 5.7 1, 704 107, 935 846
Army Medical 56.5 41.2 2.3 1 36, 008 244
Army National  Guard 41.0 56.3 2.7 1 95, 487 263
Space and Missile Def. 15.3 58.7 26.0 4 3, 106 60
Army Tank-Automotive 36.1 54.1 9.9 12 50, 487 776
Army J Munitions 36.9 56.3 6.8 38 4, 489 242
DISA 19.9 79.5 0.7 102 49, 382 254
DLA 25.3 74.0 0.7 204 2, 729, 894 2564
DARPA 12.2 23.6 64.2 0 1, 166 12
Wash HQ Serv. 19.2 67.6 13.2 3 5, 458 36
MDA 5.8 40.6 53.6 0 1, 952 111
Defense Commiss. 3.0 96.3 0.7 0 52, 826 95
DTRA 26.9 59.5 13.7 0 2, 912 67
ONR 57.5 31.3 11.2 1 23, 460 109
Naval Med. 48.9 50.2 0.9 0 63, 631 105
NavAir 33.7 54.9 11.3 6 39, 757 539
NavSup 50.3 45.4 4.4 10 281, 770 576
NavSea 46.4 49.9 3.7 6 88, 467 515
Naval Fac.  Eng. 8.8 85.1 6.1 6 100, 438 899
Marine Corps 42.7 55.1 2.2 49 82, 320 252
S&N Warfare 29.4 68.5 2.1 150 89, 056 201
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determined by the nature of the good or service the agency wishes to acquire. 
Consequently, we primarily take these non-discretionary characteristics as 
exogenously given, and ignore the possibility that the agency will adjust these 
features on the margin when workloads change. There is one aspect of the contract, 
award type, over which the contracting officer may have limited discretion at the 
margin. For most of the analysis, we will treat award type as given, and return at the 
end to the question of substitution among award types. Finally, contracting officers 
have a great deal of discretion over other contracting features such as the nature of 
competition and pricing terms.  When contracting officers’ workloads change, we 
look for adjustments in the mix of these “discretionary” features.  Specifically, we 
analyze the effects of workload on four aspects of contracts:  competition, pricing 
terms, modification, and outlays. 
Contracts differ first according to the product or service the agency is 
procuring.  The General Services Administration classifies every product or service 
purchased by the U.S. federal government as one of 24 broad service classes or 
one of 90 broad product classes.28 The FPDS-NG reports the primary 
product/service class of every contract.  Some of these classes, such as Nuclear 
Ordinance, are not represented or are very small, so we merge them with 
neighboring categories. After these combinations, there are 55 broad 
product/service categories.29 
Second, contracts differ according to the award type.  Awards are first 
categorized by whether the contract specifies a fixed quantity (definitive contract) or 
not (indefinite delivery vehicle).  Awards can also be categorized by whether they 
are original (i.e., new) contractual actions or modifications to existing contracts. For 
this paper, the unit of observation is the original contract. We do not consider the 
effect of workload on the contractual terms of modifications, because the terms of a 
                                            
28 For definitions, see Federal Procurement Data System Product and Service Codes Manual (GSA, 
2011) 
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modified contract depend in part on the terms specified in the original contract. 
Consequently, it is unclear whether the workload at the time of the original contract 
or the workload at the time of the modification should affect the terms of the modified 
contract. Moreover, the existence of the modification is, itself, an outcome that might 
be affected by workload, so sample selection is a concern when looking at the 
contractual terms of modifications. Within the class of definitive contracts, a given 
acquisition occurs either under simplified acquisitions procedures (for procurements 
below $150,000) or under the general acquisitions procedures. Simplified definitive 
contracts are referred to as purchase orders and make up the majority of the 
definitive contracts (about 1.3 million out of 1.4 million) but the minority of definitive 
procurement dollars (about $40 billion out of $420 billion in the sample). 
In addition to the two sorts of definitive contracts, there is a third award type, 
referred to here as “delivery orders,” which consists of calls on IDVs. As discussed 
previously, an IDV is an umbrella contract that specifies a framework under which a 
broad class of specific procurements can be made. A delivery order is a specific 
agreement to procure under the broad terms of the IDV, but under the further terms 
and conditions particular to that specific procurement. A delivery order is a contract 
in its own right, with its own terms and modifications, but the contracting officer does 
not start from scratch, so his flexibility is somewhat limited. These contracts are very 
important, making up over 3 million of the 4.6 million original contracts, and more 
than half of all procurement spending (about $800 billion out of the $1.45 trillion in 
procurement spending by the DoD in our sample years). 
There are four main features of contracts that contracting officers can adjust 
as their workloads vary. The first discretionary feature is the pricing structure. For 
simplicity, we divide the pricing structure of contracts into two broad categories: firm-
fixed-price contracts and variable-price contracts. In fact, contracting officers can 
choose from a continuum of pricing structures, including firm fixed price; fixed price 
with various price adjustments, effort requirements, and incentive payments; cost 
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hybrid forms. Firm-fixed-price contracts make up 88% of all original contracts in our 
sample. The FAR (2012) specifies that agencies should use fixed-price contracts 
when “the risk involved is minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable degree of 
certainty. (FAR, 16.103b)” Official government policy is to prefer firm-fixed-price 
contracts when possible. 
The second discretionary feature available to contracting officers is the extent 
to which the contract is competed. The most competitive option, called “full-and-
open competition,” allows all responsible sources to compete. Full-and-open 
competition includes sealed bids, competitive proposals, and combinations of 
competitive procedures.  Contracting officers can also choose a more limited form of 
competition called “full-and-open competition after exclusion of sources,” which 
prohibits some otherwise qualified sources from participating in the competition.  
Sources may be excluded if doing so would reduce total costs without harming 
competition, aid national defense, maintain a reliable source, or fulfill a critical need. 
Officers are not required to report the reason for exclusion, but it is an optional data 
element. Among those who report (27%), the most commonly cited reasons are that 
a contract is a follow-on contract or has some unique sources. Finally, a contracting 
officer may choose not to compete a contract at all, either because a statue explicitly 
prohibits competition (not available for competition) or because only one source was 
solicited for reasons authorized by regulation and justified by the contracting officer 
(not competed). The most common justifications for not competing a contract are the 
availability of only one responsible source who can satisfy agency requirements, and 
unusual and compelling urgency. 
Third, the extent to which a contracting officer completely specifies an original 
contract influences the probability of modification and the number of modifications of 
the original contract.  There are several reported reasons for contract modifications.  
Over half of the reported modifications are strictly administrative, a funding only 
action, or a close out of a completed contract.  But about 41% of modifications 
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additional work, change orders, the exercise of options, and bilateral supplemental 
agreements. The remaining 3% are an assortment of cancelations, terminations, and 
movements between definitive and indefinite contracts. 
Finally, the choices the contracting officer makes with respect to competition, 
pricing terms, and modifications influence the size of the government’s financial 
obligation from a contract.  Every original contract has an initial level of expected 
obligation determined at the time of the contract award, which may be altered by 
later modifications. We look at initial and final obligation separately, since the model 
predicts individual effects on each. 
Tables 11–13 present the summary statistics for the contract and agency 
features that form the basis for the regressions in our analysis. Table 11 presents 
the statistics for definitive contracts. The two major columns divide these contracts 
into firm-fixed-price and variable-price contracts, while the sub-columns further 
divide them into contracts that are eventually modified and those that are not. Each 
row is the sample mean and standard deviation from the indicated variable in the 
appropriate subset of contracts. The top panel includes contract-level variables, 
while the bottom panel includes agency-level variables, averaged over all the 
contracts of the indicated type. Tables 12 and 13 are similarly structured, but for 
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Table 11. Original Definitive Contracts 
 
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations for definitive contracts by pricing variety and eventual 
modification. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010), 
although the Army agencies are limited to 2005–2008. Top-panel variables are contract-level data 
elements and bottom-panel variables are office-level data elements, weighted by the number of 
contracts. 
Variable Price          Firm Fixed Price 
No Mod.      Mod.      No Mod.      Mod. 
Pct.  Mod. 





 (0.450)  (0.489) (0.493)  (0.488) 
Excl. of Sources 0.410  0.434 0.278  0.231 
 (0.492)  (0.496) (0.448)  (0.421) 
Not Comp. 0.0571  0.117 0.204  0.168 
 (0.232)  (0.322) (0.403)  (0.374) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.809  2.808 0.365  2.439 
 (8.471)  (40.61) (2.680)  (34.82) 
Final Oblig ($M2009) 1.066  14.90 0.390  4.883 
 (8.724)  (188.9) (3.076)  (51.60) 
Modifications 0  4.806 0  3.438 
 (0)  (29.47) (0)  (6.393) 
Pct.  Classified 0.138  0.127 0.0961  0.0837 
 (0.190)  (0.184) (0.143)  (0.159) 
Pct.  10-20 0.202  0.204 0.177  0.192 
 (0.0650)  (0.0554) (0.0530)  (0.0586) 
Pct.  20+ 0.514  0.531 0.529  0.537 
 (0.0865)  (0.0694) (0.101)  (0.0937) 
C. Officers 1105.2  1051.0 1346.9  940.6 
 (977.0)  (913.6) (1024.8) (745.1) 
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Table 12. Purchase Orders 
 
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations for purchase orders by pricing variety and eventual 
modification. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010), 
although the Army agencies are limited to 2005–2008. Top-panel variables are contract-level data 
elements and bottom-panel variables are office-level data elements, weighted by the number of 
contracts. 
Variable Price          Firm Fixed Price 
No Mod.      Mod.      No Mod.      Mod. 
Pct.  Mod. 





 (0.472)  (0.403) (0.497)  (0.479) 
Excl. of Sources 0.111  0.208 0.219  0.258 
 (0.314)  (0.406) (0.414)  (0.437) 
Not Comp. 0.438  0.458 0.197  0.330 
 (0.496)  (0.498) (0.398)  (0.470) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.125  0.0902 0.0248  0.0592 
 (2.948)  (0.299) (0.160)  (0.228) 
Final Oblig ($M2009) 0.127  0.137 0.0252  0.0829 
 (2.949)  (0.437) (0.164)  (1.440) 
Modifications 0  1.819 0  1.430 
 (0)  (1.392) (0)  (1.023) 
Pct.  Classified 0.0941  0.0623 0.0946  0.0598 
 (0.103)  (0.139) (0.107)  (0.135) 
Pct.  10-20 0.190  0.211 0.172  0.196 
 (0.0433)  (0.0530) (0.0558)  (0.0671) 
Pct.  20+ 0.477  0.515 0.494  0.511 
 (0.0766)  (0.0725) (0.0829)  (0.101) 
C. Officers 819.6  1077.9 1748.8  891.7 
 (810.8)  (679.3) (1059.8) (794.5) 
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Table 13. Delivery Orders 
 
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations for delivery orders by pricing variety and eventual 
modification.  The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010), 
although the Army agencies are limited to 2005–2008. Top-panel variables are contract-level data 
elements and bottom-panel variables are office-level data elements, weighted by the number of 
contracts. 
For definitive contracts, 63% of the variable-price definitive contracts are 
eventually modified, while only 40% of the fixed-price definitive contracts are. This 
same pattern holds for the other two award types.  We also see that, conditional on 
being modified, variable-price contracts are modified more frequently. Finally, there 
appear to be bigger changes to the variable-price contracts, at least in terms of the 
change in dollars obligated between the initial and final levels. This pattern is 
consistent with the idea that contracting officers choose variable-price contracts if 
renegotiation is likely. 
 Variable Price 
No Mod.      Mod. 
Firm Fixed Price 
No Mod.      Mod. 
Pct.  Mod 15 9
Full and Open Comp. 0.695 0.625 0.702 0.594 
 (0.461) (0.484) (0.458) (0.491) 
Excl. of Sources 0.162 0.145 0.161 0.227 
 (0.369) (0.352) (0.368) (0.419) 
Not Comp. 0.114 0.138 0.0955 0.110 
 (0.318) (0.345) (0.294) (0.313) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.203 1.277 0.0920 0.728 
 (6.431) (16.05) (1.169) (8.833) 
Final Oblig ($M2009) 0.225 3.168 0.0939 1.004 
 (6.508) (50.02) (1.201) (12.79) 
Modifications 0 2.446 0 1.846 
 (0) (3.813) (0) (2.385) 
Pct.  Classified 0.112 0.0815 0.108 0.0775 
 (0.110) (0.159) (0.0810) (0.144) 
Pct.  10-20 0.184 0.202 0.163 0.195 
 (0.0593) (0.0572) (0.0476) (0.0584) 
Pct.  20+ 0.499 0.544 0.482 0.509 
 (0.0719) (0.0824) (0.0621) (0.0892) 
C. Officers 1811.2 808.5 2090.4 1046.8 
 (1027.6) (773.5) (901.1) (829.9) 
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The sample statistics reveal no obvious pattern of competition. For definitive 
contracts, the firm-fixed-price contracts appear to be more subject to full-and-open 
competition and less subject to exclusion of sources, but they are also more likely to 
be not competed at all. Purchase orders are similar, but for delivery orders there 
does not seem to be much difference in the use of competition among pricing terms. 
Now consider workload.  Firm-fixed-price contracts are, on average, being 
written by agencies with more contracting officers, across all three award types. For 
definitive contracts, the average firm-fixed-price contract is written in an agency with 
1,184 contracting officers, while the average variable-price contract is written in an 
agency with 1,072 officers. The difference is even bigger for the other two award 
types.  A similar pattern arises when comparing modified contracts to non-modified 
contracts within an award type and pricing class.  For every award/pricing 
combination except for variable-price purchase orders (of which there are only 
6,600), the average non-modified contract was written in an agency with many more 
contracting officers than was the average modified contract. Again, this pattern is 
consistent with the idea that agencies with many people to do the work write more 
complete contracts and make greater use of fixed-price contracts. 
Finally, consider the distribution of contractual terms when we consider only 
those contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Table 14 presents those data for 
all award types pooled together. Essentially, there are two sets of contracts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. There are a handful (about 600) of enormous variable-price 
delivery orders written off LOGCAP IV and related IDV umbrella contracts. These 
make up about 70% of the non-classified procurement spending in our sample of 
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. But even within this class there is some variation.  
For example, about a quarter of these delivery orders are executed as written, and it 
is still true that these unmodified contracts were written by agencies with more 
contracting officers on staff.  The rest of the procurement in Iraq and Afghanistan is 
made up of a large collection of relatively small firm-fixed-price contracts (about 
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modified, and mostly consist of purchase orders and relatively small definitive 
contracts. 
Table 14. Contracts Performed in Iraq or Afghanistan 
 
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations for contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan by 
pricing variety and eventual modification.  The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over 
up to six years (2005–2010), although the Army agencies are limited to 2005–2008. Top-panel 
variables are contract-level data elements and bottom-panel variables are office-level data elements, 
weighted by the number of contracts. 
Although the patterns in the sample statistics are broadly consistent with our 
explanation for the role of contracting officer workload, differences in sample means 
could very easily be driven by numerous factors that just happen to be correlated 
Variable Price          Firm Fixed Price 
 No Mod. Mod. No Mod. Mod. 
Definitive 0 0.0409 0.163 0.290 
 (0) (0.198) (0.369) (0.454) 
Purch  Order 0.00641 0.00430 0.656 0.525 
 (0.0801) (0.0655) (0.475) (0.499) 
Delivery 0.994 0.955 0.181 0.185 
 (0.0801) (0.208) (0.385) (0.388) 
Full and Open Comp. 0.801 0.845 0.992 0.971 
 (0.400) (0.362) (0.0914) (0.167) 
Excl. of Sources 0.128 0.0774 0.000960 0.00497 
 (0.335) (0.268) (0.0310) (0.0703) 
Not Comp. 0.0256 0.0624 0.00693 0.0186 
 (0.159) (0.242) (0.0830) (0.135) 
Init Oblig ($M2009) 6.156 19.62 0.211 1.433 
 (16.30) (72.64) (2.754) (6.182) 
Final Oblig ($M2009) 8.524 86.14 0.210 1.928 
 (33.29) (573.6) (3.080) (11.12) 
Modifications 0 5.065 0 2.064 
 (0) (7.449) (0) (6.007) 
Pct.  Classified 0.222 0.273 0.000919 0.00642 
 (0.200) (0.200) (0.0150) (0.0454) 
Pct.  10-20 0.181 0.188 0.171 0.178 
 (0.0460) (0.0458) (0.0110) (0.0235) 
Pct.  20+ 0.524 0.546 0.653 0.609 
 (0.0716) (0.0543) (0.0805) (0.0721) 
C. Officers 1645.7 1556.7 283.7 413.6 
 (1065.7) (987.8) (183.3) (399.3) 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 76 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
with the number of contracting officers. In the next section, we control for many of 
these factors econometrically in order to uncover the direct relationship between 
workload and contractual terms. 
Econometric Specification of Workload 
Designing a measure of workload that is consistent across agencies and time 
is challenging for several reasons. For example, the problems of using 
straightforward workload measures, such as the number of contracts per officer or 
dollars obligated per officer, have been well established (Black, 1995; Reed, 2010) 
and are present here as well. The degree of contract complexity varies across 
agencies, so simply adding up the number of contracts or dollars would overstate 
the workload of officers in those agencies who have relatively simple tasks to 
perform and understate the workload of officers in those agencies with relatively 
complex tasks. Since contracting officers’ choices of the procurement and 
contractual terms are impacted by the product or service’s complexity, these simple 
measures of workload would produce biased results. As a result, we do not try to 
directly estimate the workload per officer. Instead, we focus on the impact of 
changes in the total number of contracting officers in an agency, while controlling for 
the number and mix of contracts the officers must manage. 
Others have attempted to create consistent measures of workload by 
applying an ex-ante weighting scheme among contracts (AFIMA, 2001; Reed, 2010). 
However, these weighted measures of workload are infeasible for this study for a 
couple of reasons.  First, some of these measures do not account for variance in 
cross-agency time use, and, therefore, cannot be consistently applied in a cross-
agency study.  Second, workload measures that can be applied consistently across 
agencies use weights that depend on the very outcomes we want to examine: 
dollars obligated, extent competed, and solicitation procedures. Using a workload 
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Given the problems with these ex-ante workload weights, we will instead take 
a flexible approach, letting the data determine the work intensity of various 
contracting actions. To measure the workload, we include a variable for (the log of) 
the number of contracting officers in each agency/year combination. To control for 
the contract mix, we count the (log of) the number of original contracts for each of 55 
different product/services classes for each agency/year combination. These counts 
are then included in each regression as 55 separate controls, indexed by j. 
Another concern with appropriately measuring workload is that many defense 
contracts are classified and are not reported for national security reasons.  If the 
share of contracts varies across agencies, then our workload measures will 
understate the workload of agencies with many unreported contracts and overstate 
the workload of agencies with few or no classified contracts.  To control for this, we 
include a proxy of the intensity of classification in the office—the fraction of the 
branch’s procurement budget that is classified in the fiscal year.  Unfortunately, this 
measure is only available at the branch level (Army, Navy, Air Force, and other-
DoD) and not at the individual office level. 
Finally, every regression will include measures of contracting-officer 
experience, including the fraction with 10–20 years of experience and the fraction 
with over 20 years of experience, agency fixed effects and trends, a year fixed 
effect, and product/service fixed effects. Formally, we estimate the following fixed-
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where employment (CO) and contract counts (X ) are measured in logs, IA is a 
dummy variable equal to one for a contract performed in Iraq or Afghanistan, E	 is 
the vector of experience controls,  is the share of classified procurement,  is 
the combination of three fixed effects (agency, year, and product class),  is 
an agency-specific year trend, and y is the outcome of interest. Across various 
contracting outcomes, our interest is in estimating the β	s, the effect of expanding 
the contracting workforce on that outcome. Intuitively, β reflects the change in 
contracting outcomes for an agency when its number of contracting officers deviates 
from trend, given contract load, mix, and experience, while controlling for agency, 
year, and product-specific factors. The errors among contracts in a given agency-
year will likely be correlated, so we will cluster our standard errors at the agency-
year level for inference. 
The econometric approach here is very similar to the approach in the Civilian 
analysis, but it differs in two ways. First, we are not able to avail ourselves of the 
instrumental-variable strategy of using retirements as a shock to workload. Since the 
DoD procurement offices are much larger than those found in most civilian agencies, 
they have about three times as many GS-1102s, on average.  By the law of large 
numbers, this increased size irons out much of the random variation in retirement 
rates. Unfortunately, this leads to a very weak and non-robust first-stage relationship 
between retirement rates and contracting-officer employment in the DoD agencies. 
Without an IV strategy, we are particularly concerned with omitted variable bias if 
agency mission changes over time (since that would not be captured in agency fixed 
effects). For this reason, we introduce a second difference from Warren—the 
introduction of agency-specific time trends. This more flexible specification will be 
robust to omitted factors that vary within an agency, over time, as long as they trend 
roughly with time.  Finally, it is important to note that the biases Warren uncovered 
for the OLS regressions were all biases toward zero, so if the underlying omitted 









Table 15 outlines the estimated relationship between decreasing workload 
and the presence and number of substantive modifications or terminations. For this 
analysis only, we limit the sample to contracts written before 2009, since enough 
time must pass to observe any modifications.  The first column presents estimates 
for the sample of definitive contracts, while the second and third present purchase 
orders and delivery orders, respectively.  Our expectation is that busier contracting 
offices should write less complete contracts, leading to an increase in ex-post 
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Table 15. The Effect of Workload on Renegotiation 
 
Notes. Panel A Dependent Variable: Indicator of a contractual termination. Panel B Dependent 
Variable: Indicator of a subsequent substantive modification.  Panel C Dependent Variable:  The log 
of one plus the number of substantive modifications. Definitive contracts are included in specification 
1, purchase orders in specification 2, and delivery orders in specification 3. In addition to the 
tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 
product/service groups, product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects and trends, and year fixed 
effects. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to four years (2005–2008). 
Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year.*,**,*** represent significance at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Def. Contract   Purch.  Order    Del. Order 
Panel  A: Termination 






C. Officers x IorA 0.03∗ ­0.02 0.01
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Iraq or Af. ­0.11 0.12 ­0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)












Panel  B: Any Substantive Modifications 






























Panel  C: Number of Substantive Modifications 






C. Officers x IorA 0.16∗ ­0.29∗∗∗ 0.14
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)






Pct.  10-20 0.51 0.95∗∗∗ ­0.78∗∗∗ 
 (0.65) (0.32) (0.31)
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All three show significant effects of workload on contract terminations, in the 
expected direction for non-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts. Increasing the number of 
contracting officers by about 10% when the original contract is signed decreases the 
probability that the contracted is later terminated by between 0.3 and 0.8 percentage 
points, on a mean of less than 1%. The relationship for contracts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan seems weaker, but it is difficult to make much of these result, since less 
than 0.1% of such contracts are ever terminated. 
The results for modifications are more mixed. For definitive contracts and 
delivery orders, more contracting officers are associated with fewer modifications, 
along both the extensive and intensive margins. In particular, increasing the number 
of contracting officers by 10%, decreases the probability of modification by about 3–
6 percentage points, and decreases the expected number of modifications by 10–
20%.  These relationships may be slightly weaker for contracts in Iraq/Afghanistan, 
but they are substantively quite similar.  Purchase orders, by contrast, seem to be 
more modified as workload declines, at least for contracts not performed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, there seems to be no relationship between 
workload and modification of purchase orders. 
To judge the size of these effects, about 10% of delivery contracts and 
purchase orders in the sample are modified at some point, while about 40% of 
definitive contracts are. The average delivery or purchase order has about 0.18 
modifications, while the average definitive contract has about 1.8. 
Consistent with the predictions of the model and the evidence for civilian 
agencies, as workload declines, agencies seem to do a better job at foreseeing 
contingencies in the original contract and delivery orders, thereby limiting the need 
for ex-post renegotiation or termination.  This relationship also holds up for the 
presumably simpler acquisition task of purchase orders, in the case of terminations, 
but seems to reverse for modifications. We will see this pattern throughout much of 
our analysis, where the model does well in prediction behavior on relatively difficult 
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Degree of Competition 
Table 16 outlines the estimated relationship between workload and the 
decision to award a contract by competitive mechanisms.  For definitive contracts 
and delivery orders, more contracting officers are associated with increased use of 
competitive procurement mechanisms. In particular, increasing the number of 
contracting officers by 10% increases the probability of full-and-open competition by 
about 2–4 percentage points, decreases the use of competition with excluded 
sources by about 1 percentage point, and decreases the probability that a contract is 
not competed at all by between 1 and 2 percentage points. The effects may be 
slightly stronger for contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the difference is 
not substantively very large. To give a sense of magnitudes, about 40% of definitive 
contracts and 69% of delivery orders are fully and openly competed, while about 
28% and 17%, respectively, are competed after exclusion. Finally, about 10% of 
delivery orders and 18% of definitive contracts are not competed at all. Again, we 
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Table 16. The Effect of Workload on Competition 
 
Notes. Dependent variable: Indicator of use of given level of competition. Not available for 
competition is the excluded class. Definitive contracts are included in specification 1, purchase orders 
in specification 2, and delivery orders in specification 3. In addition to the tabulated regressors, each 
specification includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 product/service groups, 
product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects and trends, and year fixed effects. The full sample 
includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005––2010).  Standard errors, in 
parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year.  *,**,*** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
Def. Contract   Purch.  Order    Del. Order 
Panel  A: Full and Open Competition 
C. Officers 0.37∗∗∗ 0.03 0.18∗∗∗ 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.04) 
C. Officers x IorA 0.11∗∗ ­0.24 0.02
 (0.05) (0.18) (0.06) 
Iraq or Af. ­0.37 2.03∗ 0.18
 (0.34) (1.23) (0.43) 
Pct.  10-20 0.32 0.12 0.18∗ 
 (0.40) (0.38) (0.10) 






Panel  B: Competition  with Exclusion 






C. Officers x IorA ­0.02 0.09 0.01
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) 












Pct.  20+ 0.07 0.61∗∗ ­0.05 
 (0.33) (0.28) (0.06) 
Panel  C: Not Competed 
C. Officers ­0.18∗∗ 0.12 ­0.10∗∗ 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) 
C. Officers x IorA ­0.06 0.07 ­0.05 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) 
Iraq or Af. 0.37 ­0.54 0.36
 (0.35) (0.99) (0.37) 






Pct.  20+ 0.03 ­0.33∗∗ ­0.12∗ 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.07) 
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This shift toward competitive acquisitions procedures as the contracting 
workforce increases is exactly what the model predicts and is consistent with the 
results for civilian agencies. 
Pricing Structure 
Table 17 presents the estimated relationship between decreasing workload 
and the pricing structure chosen by the contracting officer. Agencies with more 
contracting officers than we would expect, given their mix of contracts, seem to be 
less likely to use firm-fixed-price contracts, at least for definitive contracts and 
purchase orders performed outside of Iraq and Afghanistan and for delivery orders 
performed in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Increasing the number of contracting officers by 
10% is associated with a decrease in the use of firm-fixed-price contracts of between 
2 and 3 percentage points. This is on a mean of about 83% for delivery orders and 
definitive contracts, and a mean of more than 99.5% for purchase orders.  Note, 
however, that within Iraq and Afghanistan, these rates rise to nearly 100% for 
definitive contracts and purchase orders and to 93% for delivery orders, so the 
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Table 17. The Effect of Workload on Contract Pricing 
 
Notes. Dependent variable: Indicator of use of a firm-fixed-price contract. Definitive contracts are 
included in specification 1, purchase orders in specification 2, and delivery orders in specification 3. In 
addition to the tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of the number of original 
contracts in 55 product/service groups, product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects and trends, 
and year fixed effects. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years 
(2005–2010).  Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year.  *,**,*** represent 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Nevertheless, this result is quite at odds with the prediction of the model and 
the evidence in civilian agencies.  This divergence suggests that our framework may 
be ignoring some factor guiding the pricing decision in the DoD that was not in play 
in the civilian agencies. As discussed in the section Complex Contracting 
Environments, many fixed-price contracts written by the DoD are highly cost based 
and, therefore, depress the cost-saving incentives generated by more typical fixed-
price contracts.  As fixed-price contracts become more like cost-plus contracts, the 
estimated effect of workload should fall toward zero as contracting officers become 
indifferent between fixed-price contracts and cost-plus contracts. However, this story 
cannot explain why the estimated effect shifts from positive to negative. 
Obligations 
Table 18 outlines the estimated relationship between workload and the initial 
and final amount obligated on the contract, taking into account later adjustments 
Def. Contract   Purch.  Order    Del. Order 
Use of Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts 






C. Officers x IorA 0.04 0.02∗∗∗ ­0.16∗∗ 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.08) 












Pct.  20+ ­0.05 0.03 ­0.46 
 (0.14) (0.06) (0.29) 
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when applicable. For definitive contracts and purchase orders, outside Iraq and 
Afghanistan, a higher number of contracting officers is associated with lower initial 
and final obligations, although the effect is bigger for initial than for final obligations.  
The relationship seems to be weaker for contracts performed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, but for definitive contracts, at least, it is still quite large. For definitive 
contracts, increasing the number of contracting officers by 10% would decrease 
initial obligations by 5–6.5% and decrease final obligations by about 5%. These 
results are consistent with the model and the results for civilian agencies. 
Table 18. The Effect of Workload on Obligations 
 
Notes. Dependent variables: The natural log of the initial and final (to date) obligations, measured in 
real 2009 dollars. Definitive contracts are included in specification 1, purchase orders in specification 
2, and delivery orders in specification 3. In addition to the tabulated regressors, each specification 
Def. Contract   Purch.  Order    Del. Order 
Panel  A: Initial  Dollars Obligated 






C. Officers x IorA 0.17 0.06 0.41∗ 
 (0.17) (0.38) (0.24) 
Iraq or Af. 0.24 0.20 ­0.64 
 (1.13) (2.60) (1.61) 






Pct.  20+ 0.11 0.31∗ ­0.76 
 (0.53) (0.19) (0.65) 
Panel  B: Total  Dollars Obligated 
C. Officers ­0.55∗∗ ­0.14 0.06 
 (0.26) (0.10) (0.18) 
C. Officers x IorA 0.07 0.11 0.43 
 (0.21) (0.40) (0.27) 
Iraq or Af. 0.58 ­0.15 ­0.75 
 (1.40) (2.72) (1.82) 
Pct.  10-20 ­1.03 0.42∗ 0.16 
 (0.74) (0.24) (0.81) 












do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 87 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 product/service groups, product/service fixed 
effects, agency fixed effects and trends, and year fixed effects. The full sample includes contracts 
from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010).  Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by 
agency-year.  *,**,*** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
There is some evidence that the relationship could go the other way for 
delivery orders, at least in Iraq and Afghanistan, although the effect is not quite 
statistically significant at conventional levels. This interaction is particularly 
interesting because it suggests that increases in the size of the contracting 
workforce are unlikely to lead to much cost cutting on the large delivery orders that 
make up such a large part of the procurement in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Contract Types 
To this point, we analyzed the three major contract award types in parallel.  
For many procurement decisions, the contracting award type is more or less dictated 
by the object and context of the procurement. But there are always marginal cases, 
and it is important to understand the patterns of substitution among the award type 
for at least two reasons. First, one of the worries cited by the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011) is that inadequate staffing of 
contracting offices operating in Iraq and Afghanistan has led them to depend 
inappropriately on the use of delivery orders, when one-off definitive contracts would 
have been more appropriate. We can investigate this question empirically. 
Second, in our analysis we sometimes found that the relationship between 
workload and contracting outcomes differed by award type. If there was a big 
substitution among award type, we might worry that these difference were caused 
simply by sample selection. Take the example of modification.  We found that higher 
workload was associated with more modification of delivery orders and definitive 
contracts, and lower modification of purchase orders.  If we found that increased 
workload was also associated with substitution from purchase orders relative to 
those other two award types, we might worry that there is no real effect on 
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they are likely to eventually modify from delivery orders or definitive contracts into 
purchase orders. 
In fact, we find that all the substitution seems to occur between definitive 
contracts and delivery orders. Table 19 presents these estimates, where each 
column is a single regression with an indicator for the named award type as the 
dependent variable.  For contracts not performed in Iraq or Afghanistan, we find that 
having more contracting officers is associated with an increased use of definitive 
contracts and a decreased use of delivery contracts. There is no statistically 
significant evidence of a change in the frequency of purchase orders. Increasing the 
number of contracting officers in an agency by about 10% would increase the use of 
definitive contracts by about 0.6 percentage points, decrease the use of delivery 
orders by about 1.2 percentage points, and increase the use of purchase orders by 
(a statistically insignificant) 0.6 percentage points.  On average, only about 2.5% of 
original contracts are definitive contracts, 67% are delivery orders, and 30% are 
purchase orders. 
Table 19. The Effect of Workload on Award Type 
 
Notes. Dependent variable: An indicator of the specified award type. Definitive contracts are in 
specification 1, purchase orders in specification 2, and delivery orders in specification 3. In addition to 
the tabulated regressors, each specification includes the log of the number of original contracts in 55 
product/service groups, product/service fixed effects, agency fixed effects and trends, and year fixed 
effects. The full sample includes contracts from 32 agencies over up to six years (2005–2010). 
Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by agency-year. *,**,*** represent significance at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 Def. Contract Purch.  Order Del. Order 
C. Officers 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06 ­0.12∗∗∗ 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
C. Officers x IorA ­0.05∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
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Although this substitution among award types is not formally explored in the 
model, we believe it is consistent in spirit. If we think about delivery orders as 
starting off with a partially written contract and simply filling in the details, their use 
might be particularly attractive to a heavily burdened contracting officer, relative to a 
definitive contract that he would need to write from scratch and award 
independently. 
For contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the case that brought this issue to the 
front of the policy debate, we actually find very little substitution. Certainly, there is 
no significant difference in the use of definitive contracts as workload changes. 
There may be some substitution toward delivery orders and away from purchase 
orders as workload increases, but the estimates are not statistically significant.  We 
conclude that the case that this sort of substitution is particularly rampant for 
contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan is weak. On the contrary, our data 
suggest that it is a general fact about contracting and, if anything, is less evident for 
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Summary of DoD Analysis and Conclusion 
This paper has explored how the variation in contracting officer workload in 
civilian agencies and in the Department of Defense (DoD) is related to contractual 
outcomes. We find evidence that higher workloads induce contracting officers to 
write less complete contracts. This reduction in contractual completeness increases 
the probability of modification, so contracting officers are less likely to award 
contracts through full-and-open competition.  Contrary to theoretical predictions and 
the civilian analysis, we find a positive relationship between workload and the use of 
fixed-price contracts. Some of this relationship between workload may be 
attributable to the combination of sole-source environments and the Truth in 
Negotiations Acts (1962, § 2306a) that mitigate the advantages of fixed-price 
contracts over more flexible cost-plus contracts. Finally, we find that when workload 
is high, contracting officers are more likely to make calls on existing indefinite 
delivery vehicles rather than write and award new definitive contracts. With the 
exception of pricing terms, our results square directly with the parallel analysis of 
civilian contracting offices. 
This paper also addresses a pressing policy question about the drivers of 
sub-optimal procurement outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan contracts. We find that 
decreasing workload increases the use of competition, increases the probability and 
frequency of renegotiation, and reduces the initial and final price paid. However, with 
the exception of competition, the effect of workload is more important for contracts 
procured outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, in contrast to the conclusion of 
the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011), we do not 
find significant evidence that higher workload causes contracting officers to prefer 
indefinite delivery vehicles over definitive contracts. Our results suggest that 
increases in the size the acquisitions workforce will affect domestic procurement at 
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Appendix (Proof) 
Let ,  and ,  represent the expected prices paid under contract form x and 
competition choice y, for the original contract and in a renegotiation, respectively. 
Given choices , , , the expected utility of the contracting officer is given by 
, , 1 1 1
1 1 1 1  
(4) 
Start by deriving the prices.  In the last stage of the game, contractors make effort 
decisions. Under a cost-plus contract, they have no incentive to put forth effort, since 
any cost reductions will be directly subtracted from their payments, so 0. 
Under a fixed-price contract, contractors are residual claimants of any cost 
reductions, so they will set effort to satisfy ′ 1. Let  
represent the net real-cost savings of this efficient effort. 
By assumption, in the renegotiation stage, the contractor will be pushed to 
zero profits by a take-it or leave-it offer from the contracting officer. In a cost-plus 
contract, this just amounts to offering no additional “plus” and simply reimbursing 
costs, so the expected price is simply , whether or not the initial contract was 
competed (so , , ). Here, the competitive contractor has lost the “plus” 
part of his cost-plus contract, due to the extreme bargaining power we assumed. 
The results are unaffected if we instead assume he keeps that portion. In a fixed-
price contract, the contracting officer and contractor anticipate the cost-saving effort 
by the contractor and so the expected total cost is , which requires a 
payment of , , 1 . 
Moving back to the original pricing stage, expected payments under 
negotiation are straightforward from the zero-profit condition. The difference 
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previous discussion, where total cost is reduced by non-contractible effort, so 
,  and , .  We assumed that competition results in the lowest-
cost producer producing at the second-lowest “bid.” Immediately ,  and 
, , where  is the second-lowest cost. With these prices in hand, I first 
show that ∗ decreases in w  and then that ∗ and ∗ increase in t		while w  has no 
direct effect, so they decrease in w, overall. 
Consider some set of strategies , ,  and some alternative set , , , 
where . We can write the difference in the contracting officer’s expected utility 
using these two sets of strategies as follows: 
, , , , , , , 
where ∙  is independent of w, since w	 only appears in the cost of contractual 
completeness. By the assumption that 	  is increasing, it follows immediately that 
this difference strictly increases w, so the contracting officer’s expected utility has 
strictly increasing differences in , . 
Consider some set of strategies 1, ,  and some alternative set 0, , . We 
can write the difference in the contracting agent’s expected utility using these two 
sets of strategies as follows: 
1, , 0, , , , 1 , , . 
Replacing for the prices derived previously, this difference becomes 
1, , 0, , 1 , 
which is strictly increasing in t  and independent of w  and y. 
Finally, consider some set of strategies , 1,  and some alternative set 
, 0, . We can write again the difference in the contracting officer’s expected utility 
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, 1, , 0, , , 1 , , . 
Replacing for the prices derived previously, this difference becomes 
, 1, , 0, , 
which is strictly increasing in	t  and independent of w  and x. 
Taken together, I have shown that the contracting officer’s objective function 
has increasing differences in , , , and , and the increases with respect to t are 
all strict. By the results of Topkis (1998), this suffices to show that ∗, ∗	, and ∗ 
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